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HUTCHINSON V. PROXMIRE AND THE NEGLECTED
FAIR COMMENT DEFENSE:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO "ACTUAL MALICE"
Charles H. Carman*
Recent Supreme Court decisions have both limited the category
of public figures and eviscerated the public interest concept there-
by restricting the defenses available to defamation defendants. Mr.
Carman suggests that the defense of fair comment, neglected since
the Supreme Court fashioned an actual malice standard, can pro-
vide defamation defendants with a shield at least as effective as the
public figure doctrine and also afford comments on topics of public
interest adequate insulation from speech-chilling defamation liabil-
ity. He supports this thesis by analyzing a series of defamation
cases decided under the public figure standard but suitable for fair
comment analysis.
In any revolution, the intensity of the struggle in some prominent arenas
causes neglect of other potentially significant matters. So it is with the
ongoing revolution in the law of defamation. The radical developments in
American libel law since 1964, when the Supreme Court first applied its
"actual malice"' standard in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 have directed
inquiry toward the plaintiff's public or private status3 and toward the defend-
ant's belief in the truth or falsity of the publication.4 With the attention of
lawyers and scholars focused on the defendant's state of mind and the
plaintiff's public exposure, a threshold question has not been asked: Is the
alleged defamation a statement of fact at all? If not, if instead the statement
* Chicago Attorney. Former Editor, down beat, a magazine of music news and criticism.
B.A., Northwestern University; M.A., University of Illinois; J.D., Loyola University (Chicago).
1. Throughout this Article, two terms are used: "malice" and "actual malice." Malice is the
common law concept of spite, hostility or ill will, reflected in the defendant's attitude toward
the plaintiff. See W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW oF TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSEn]. "Actual malice," used with quotation marks throughout this Arti-
cle, refers to the defendant's knowledge of the truth or falsity of his allegedly defamatory state-
ment. The two must not be confused. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court ruled that the first amendment prohibits recovery of
damages by a public official for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the
official proves that the statement was made with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80. The Court termed this mental state
"actual malice." Id.
3. See notes 21-31 and accompanying text infra. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ 118, at 823-30; Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel: A Concept in Search of a
Definition, 33 Bus. LAw. '709, 717 (1978).
4. The decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), "made it essen-
tial to proving liability that the plaintiff focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defend-
ant." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979). So important is the defendant's mental state
that, in Lando, the Supreme Court allowed discovery proceedings to invade the usually sacro-
sanct domain of editorial decisions when necessary for a public figure to establish "actual
malice." Id. at 170-75.
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reflects an opinion, then courts need not consider whether the public figure
doctrine triggers the plaintiff's burden to prove "actual malice." The
appropriate defense for opinions and criticism is fair comment.5 Use of the
"actual malice" standard-knowledge of a statement's falsity or reckless dis-
regard of its truth or falsity 6-only makes sense when applied to an issue of
truth.7 When the alleged defamation states an opinion, legal doctrine and
common sense agree that it should not be actionable.'
Nevertheless, American courts have sometimes applied an "actual malice"
analysis to statements of opinion." Although these courts have usually
reached the same defendant-oriented results as they would have under a
more suitable fair comment approach, beginning with Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,"5 the Supreme Court has repeatedly circumscribed the realm of
public figures that will engage the plaintiff's burden of showing "actual
malice."" As defamation defendants slowly lose the protection of the
"actual malice" burden imposed on public figure plaintiffs, the courts may
become receptive to attempts to revive the common law doctrine of fair
comment, so that a constricted category of public figures will not chill the
5. The doctrine of fair comment protects the defamation defendant from liability when the
alleged defamatory statement is an opinion, is based on truly stated facts, is not an overly
personal attack, is related to a matter of public interest, and is not made with malice. See F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.28 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES];
W. PROsSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OiF TORTS § 110 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER (3d ed.)]; Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1362-64 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Eaton]. Commentators and courts have differed on whether the fair comment doctrine is
properly denominated a privilege or a delfense. See HARPER & JAMES, supra, § 5.28, at 457;
Eaton, supra, at 1363. This Article refers to fair comment variously as a doctrine, a privilege
and a defense, and does not involve itself in this argument.
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
7. See discussion of malice at notes 193-213 and accompanying text infra.
8. The better reasoned cases have recognized the need for free-wheeling acceptance of
opinions. "If an individual publishes an unreasonable opinion based on vague and invalid stand-
ards he libels himself and not the object of his opinion." Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514,
544 n.33, 343 A.2d 251, 270 n.33 (1975) (fair comment defense asserted), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
907 (1976). That opinions are less persuasive than statements of fact is an axiom crucial to an
understanding of the role of fair comment. A reader or listener who understands that a state-
ment is opinion is left free to make up his or her own mind on the subject. Thus, when a
defendant attacked the plaintiff's study of the psychological effects of radio, the court observed
that the defendant's opinion "will undoubtedly reinforce the minds of those who disagree with
the plaintiff, and probably will have no effect upon those who think as [the plaintiff] has writ-
ten." Berg v. Printers' Ink Pub. Co., 54 F. Supp. 795, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (fair comment
defense asserted). Accord, Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 263 A.D. 403, 412, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840,
849 (1942).
9. E.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). See notes 35-56 & 218-280 and
accompanying text infra.
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976).
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freedom to speak. This chill can be felt in the aftermath of the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire .1
2
After discussing the changes in state defamation law produced by the Su-
preme Court's post-New York Times decisions, this Article evaluates the
Court's Hutchinson v. Proxmire decision which reveals the need for judicial
analysis that extends beyond public figure issues. A framework for such
analysis is provided by fair comment, the next topic examined. Special con-
sideration is afforded the components of this common law defense, the im-
pact of Supreme Court defamation decisions on the defense's elements, and
how the defense could have changed the outcome in Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire. Finally, this Article illustrates the potential of fair comment by ap-
plying the defense to a range of cases that were decided under an "actual
malice" approach.
CONTEMPORARY LIBEL LAW: THE "ACTUAL MALICE" BACKDROP
AND HUTCHINSON V. PROXMIRE
Liability for a defamatory statement normally requires the presence of
four elements: 13 (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; 11
12. 443 U.S. Ill (1979).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
14. A defamatory statement is defined by the American Law Institute as one that "'tends so
to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating with him." Id. § 559. Court definitions of defamation have
tended toward litanies of actionable categories, such as "words which tend to expose one to
public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, deg-
radation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons,
and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society." Kimmerle v. New
York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933). Even these definitions
are not all inclusive because an assertion that arouses only pity or sympathy may also be action-
able. See Cowper v. Vannier, 20 I11. App. 2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (3d Dist. 1959) (imputation
of insanity); Katapodis v. Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 287 N.Y. 17, 38 N.E.2d 112 (1941) (imputa-
tion of poverty). See generally ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 7 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as ELDREDGE]; PROSSER, supra note 1, § 111.
In addition, the defamatory statement must be false. "One who publishes a defamatory
statement of fact is not subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true." RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977). The statement need not, however, be literally true in every
detail. See, e.g., Smith v. Byrd, 255 Miss. 331, 83 So. 2d 172 (1955) (statement that sheriff shot
a man was justified by proof that the sheriff was acting in concert with the deputy who shot
him). See PSOSSER, supra note 1, § 116.
At common law, the defendant had the burden of pleading and proving a statement's truth.
See Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn. 504, 34 A. 865 (1896); Bingham v. Gaynor, 203
N.Y. 27, 96 N.E. 84 (1911). The introduction of constitutional restrictions on state defamation
law has, however, required the plaintiff to prove at least negligence in the publication of the
defamation. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974). That limitation was
introduced without a corresponding delineation of how the burden of proof changed, causing the
American Law Institute to express "no opinion on the extent to which the common law rule
... has been changed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613, caveat (1977). See ELDREOGE,
supra, § 63; Eaton, supra note 5, at 1426-31.
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(2) an unprivileged" publication of that statement to at least one third
party; 16 (3) some minimum level of fault on the part of the defendant; 17 and
15. Privileges are normally categorized as absolute or qualified. Absolute privileges provide
immunity for otherwise actionable conduct "because the defendant is acting in furtherance of
some interest of social importance, which, is entitled to protection even at the expense of un-
compensated harm to the plaintiff's reputation." PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114. See also Harper,
Privileged Defamation, 22 VA. L. REV. 642 (1936); Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 463 (1909). Absolute privilege has been held to encompass: (1) judicial pro-
ceedings; (2) legislative proceedings; (3) e,:ecutive communications; (4) communications between
husband and wife; and (5) expressions having the defendant's consent. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 583-592A (1977); ELDREDGE, supra note 14, §§ 72-76; PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 114; Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Govern-
meet Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1960); Note, Gravel and Legislative Immunity,
73 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1973).
Qualified privileges arise when the defendant's statement is regarded as having a lesser, or
intermediate, social importance, so that the privilege "is conditioned upon publication in a
reasonable manner and for a proper purpose." PRossEn, supra note 1, § 115, at 786. At com-
mon law, the interests protected by qualified privilege included: (1) publication of matters
necessary for the protection or advancement of the publisher's own legitimate interests; (2)
statements necessary for the protection of third-party interests; (3) statements reasonably calcu-
lated to protect or further a common interest of the publisher and recipient; (4) communications
made to those who may be expected to take official action for the protection of a public interest;
(5) publications fitting within the doctrine of fair comment; and (6) reports of public proceed-
ings. Id. Abuse of a qualified privilege results in forfeiture of the defendant's immunity. See
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 599 (1977); Hallen, Excessive Publication in Defamation, 16
MINN. L. REV. 160 (1932). Abuse may take the form of express malice, Kruse v. Rabe, 80 N.J.
378, 79 A. 316 (1911) (advice by an attorney to his client about the integrity of the client's
business associate is slanderous and without need of publication or loud utterance if made in
public place and addressed to the business associate and not the client), the publication of
defamatory matter to an audience whose attention is not necessary or useful in furthering the
interest giving rise to the privilege, Sias v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mich. 542, 127 N.W.2d
357 (1964) (accusation of theft in the presence of third party), or the publication of irrelevant
defamatory matter, Hines v. Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669, 52 So. 2d 705 (1910) (letter sent by
superintendent of agents of insurance company to agents referring to representative of another
company as dishonest, lacking in brains, undiplomatic and pessimistic, is libelous per se and
exceeds any privilege). Note that the dimensions of the qualified privilege have been modified
by the Supreme Court's imposition of first amendment concerns on state defamation law. See
notes 21-34 and accompanying text infra.
16. "Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by negligent act
to one other than the person defamed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 577(1) (1977).
Further, "it is enough that it is communicated to a single individual other than the one de-
famed." Id. § 577, Comment b. Thus, without communication of the defamatory material to a
third party an action for defamation cannot be maintained. Busby v. First Christian Church, 153
La. 377, 95 So. 869 (1923); Fry v. McCord Bros., 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W. 568 (1895); Almy v.
Kramme, 63 Wash. 2d 326, 387 P.2d 372 (1963). The publication need not be oral or written. It
may be made by means of a picture, Louka v. Park Entertainments Inc., 294 Mass. 268, 1
N.E.2d 41 (1936), a statue, Monson v. Tussauds, Ltd., [1894] 1 Q.B. 671, or by gesture, Hird
v. Wood, [1894] 38 Sol. J. 234 (pointing at a sign).
17. Defendants are not liable for defamation of public officials unless the statement was
"made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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(4) the presence of special harm 8 caused by the publisher, or the existence
of circumstances giving rise to an action irrespective of the presence or ab-
sence of special harm.' Contemporary libel law represents extensive mod-
ifications of common law defamation by Supreme Court decisions spanning
the past seventeen years. Before the Supreme Court's intervention, the
common law of defamation, as expressed by the original Restatement of
Torts, provided for liability upon a showing of "an unprivileged publication
of false and defamatory matter of another which (a) is actionable irrespective
of special harm, or (b) if not so actionable, is the legal cause of special harm
to the other." 20 The Supreme Court began to refashion libel law by inter-
posing first amendment concerns in the 1964 landmark, New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan .21 There, the Court required public officials suing for defamation
to prove that the alleged defamatory falsehoods were stated with " 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not." 2 The "actual malice"
standard significantly changed the minimum standard of fault by eliminating
all strict liability23 for defamatory statements made about public officials. '
The same standard applies to public figures. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In
cases of defamation of private individuals, the states are free to define any standard of liability
as long as they do not impose liability without fault; at least negligence is required. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
18. "Special harm ... is the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575, Comment b (1977). The Restatement uses the term
"harm" rather than damages, preferring to reserve the term "damages" for the plaintiff's final
compensation. See ELDREDGE, supra note 14, § 30.
19. A slander is actionable irrespective of the presence of special harm if it imputes to the
plaintiff a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, serious sexual misconduct, or conduct adversely
affecting his or her fitness for the proper conduct of his or her lawful business, trade or profes-
sion. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 570-574 (1977). All libel is actionable without proof of
special harm when the publication is defamatory on its face. Most courts, however, hold that if
extrinsic facts must be used to demonstrate the libel, the libel is not actionable without proof of
special harm unless it falls within one of the four slander categories above. See PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 112; Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy-The Requirements of Proof
of Damages in Libel, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1972).
20. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938).
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Before the New York Times decision, defamatory remarks were not
considered within the umbrella of first amendment protection. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942) (the punishment of certain classes of speech, including libelous
words, does not raise any constitutional problem). Accord, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 266 (1952) (libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 707, 715 (1931).
22. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
23. Strict liability for defamatory statements was first imposed in Jones v. Hulton & Co.,
[1909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd, [1910] A.C. 20. The defendants published what they believed to be a
fictitious story about one Artemus Jones, whom they intended and believed to be fictitious, who
had been seen with a woman other than his wife. An attorney named Artemus Jones then sued
claiming that his neighbors understood the story as referring to him. The House of Lords
affirmed a decision favorable to him, holding that the defendant's innocence was no protection
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The actual malice standard was extended in 1967 to a case in which plaintiff
was a public figure,' and in 1971 to a case with a private plaintiff in which
the allegedly libelous matter was published about an issue of general or
public concern."
This trend toward broader applications of the "actual malice" standard was
reversed in 1974 by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.27 In Gertz, the Supreme
Court rejected application of "actual malice" to matters of general or public
concern, and limited the concept of a "public figure" by excluding a promi-
nent Chicago attorney, writer, and lecturer from that category.' In 1976, the
against liability. Other instances where the defendant has been held liable without regard to
fault include, for example: cases where the defendant did not intend to make the statement,
Upton v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900) (typographical error
changed "cultured gentlemen" to "colored gentleman"); where the statement was true of one of
two persons having the same name but not the other, Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F.2d
207 (D.C. Cir. 1925) (newspaper item reporting arrest of "Harry Kennedy, an attorney, 40
years old" held libelous as to Harry F. Kennedy, the only attorney by that name in the District
and about 37 years old, when the person arrested was from Detroit and was Harry P.L. Ken-
nedy); or where the defamatory meaning was attached by extrinsic facts of which the defendant
was unaware, Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 11904] Sess. Cas. 645 (Scottish case in which plaintiff
who had been married only one month was announced to have given birth to twins). See
generally PRossER, supra note 1, § 113, at 772-74.
24. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The reach of the designation "public
official" has been only partially defined. Although the New York Times Court declined "to
determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official'
designation would extend," 376 U.S. at 283, two years later the Court offered some guidance.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1956), the Court stated: "[Tlhe 'public official' designa-
tion applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have,
or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs." Id. Officials found by the Court to be public officials include an elected
city commissioner, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), criminal court judges,
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), a chief of police, Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356
(1965), an elected court clerk, Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967), and a
deputy sheriff, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). Accord, Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc.
212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (occupants of even minor governmental positions are
public officials). The Court has continued to refrain from setting precise limits, emphasizing
instead the principle that debate on public issues "should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. Thus, the public official definition
apparently turns on the significance of the issues involving the defamed individual.
25. Public figures have been defined as those who "have assumed roles of special promi-
nence in the affairs of society," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), or those
who have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. Accord, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
453 (1976).
26. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., .403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
27. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
28. Id. at 352. That individuals may be public figures for limited purposes has been explic-
itly recognized by the Supreme Court: "Some [persons] occupy positions of such persuasive
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly,
those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public con-
troversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. at 345.
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brethren retreated further, holding in Time, Inc. v. Firestone" that the wife
of an industrial family scion was not a public figure regarding her divorce 30
even though she held press conferences during her divorce proceedings.
Most recently, Hutchinson v. Proxmire3' removed a research scientist who
had obtained nearly a half million dollars of public money for his research
from the sphere of public figures for purposes of discussing his work.
Loath to apply "actual malice" in a variety of situations, the Supreme
Court has caused uncertainty and contradictory application of that concept
by lower courts. The essence of libel actions therefore is being lost in the
nuances of "actual malice," 31 the status of individual plaintiffs, and cavalier
judicial attitudes toward the public interest.' The time is overripe for de-
fense attorneys in libel actions to first determine the nature of the alleged
defamation, because if found to be opinions, such actions can be defended
without entering the public figure-"actual malice" thicket.
The most recent example of trigger-happy public figure analysis is Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire.3s  There, Senator William Proxmire bestowed his
monthly Golden Fleece Award--"for the organization or person who has
29. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
30. The Court held that Mary Alice Firestone, wife of the head of the wealthy industrial
family of the same surname, was not a public figure for the purpose of determining the constitu-
tional protection afforded to a report of her divorce. Id. at 455. The Court held that Ms.
Firestone did not "choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married life," id. at 454, but
was "compelled to go to Court." Id. Her attempts to satisfy inquirying reporters through press
conferences did not convert her into a public figure because the interviews should not have affected
the outcome of the trial and were not intended to do so. Id. at 454 n.3.
31. 443 U.S. Ill (1979).
32. See discussion of fair comment cases in text accompanying notes 219-270 infra. Part of
the uncertainty has resulted from the Supreme Court's choice of the term "actual malice" to
describe the defendant's state of mind when knowingly or recklessly making a false statement of
fact. In libel actions at common law, "malice" referred to the defendant's spite or ill will, not
knowledge of the truth of his or her statements. Lower courts have therefore continually con-
fused these two terms. See Greenbelt Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970) (trial court's
instructions to jury that a public figure could recover in libel suit if defendant's publication had
been made with malice, defined as including spite, hostility, or deliberate intention to harm,
found to be constitutionally insufficient; decision in favor of plaintiff reversed and remanded);
Beckley Newspapers v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) (jury instructions that liability follows
from personal spite, ill will, a desire to injure plaintiff, or a bad or corrupt motive held imper-
missible and decision awarding an elected official damages reversed and remanded); Henry v.
Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (judgments awarding damages to public figures reversed be-
cause jury might have understood instructions to permit recovery on showing of intent to inflict
harm, rather than on showing of intent to inflict harm through falsehood); Evand v. Lawson,
351 F. Supp. 279, 286 (W.D. Va. 1972) (liability ruled contingent upon proof of actual malice,
or utter disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement or knowledge of the statement's
falsity).
33. See notes 170-192 and accompanying text infra.
34. See discussion of hidden fair comment cases in text accompanying notes 219-270 infra.
35. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
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most utterly wasted your tax dollars"-to three federal agencies that granted
about $500,000 over seven years to Dr. Ronald Hutchinson, a research be-
havioral scientist. According to Proxmire, Hutchinson's work determined
"under what conditions rats, monkeys and humans bite and clench their
jaws." 6  Labeling Hutchinson's work for the different agencies as "ex-
tremely similar and perhaps duplicative,"37 Proxmire claimed that "the good
doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a
monkey out of the taxpayer." ' Proxmire trumpeted the "transparent worth-
lessness" of the research in a press release, a newsletter to his constituents,
a television appearance, and a speech on the Senate floor.3 9
Dr. Hutchinson clenched his jaw and sued Proxmire for libel. The federal
district court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judg-
ment for Proxmire,' ° finding Hutchinson to be both a public figure and a
public official 4 for purposes of the suit, so that Hutchinson's failure to prove
"actual malice" on Senator Proxmire's part in making the statements was
fatal. 42  The district court relied in the alternative upon state defamation
law. Without ruling which state's law controlled, ' 3 the court held that fair
comment was either a complete defense or a qualified privilege."
36. 579 F.2d at 1036. The press release and newsletter provide a lively account of Dr.
Hutchinson's work, in addition to containing some of Senator Proxmire's allegedly defamatory
statements. The release and newsletter are appended to the appellate court's opinion, id. at
1036-38 app. A & B. The press release is reprinted in full in an Appendix to this Article.
37. Id. at 1037 app. A.
38. id.
39. Id. at 1030.
40. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1333 (W.D. Wis. 1977). The court also
held that the speech or debate clause protected Proxmire's Senate speech. Id. at 1325. The
speech or debate clause provides that "Senators and Representatives ... for any speech or
debate in either House .. . shall not be questioned in any other place." U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 6. On appeal, the Supreme Court limited protection to Proxmire's speech in the Senate
because only that statement was "essential to the deliberations of the Senate." 443 U.S. at 130
(citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 622-26 (1972)).
41. Public officials and public figures axe discussed in notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text
infra.
42. 431 F. Supp. at 1327-28.
43. Applying the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the district court attempted to follow the choice of
law principles of Wisconsin, the state in which it was sitting. 431 F. Supp. at 1330. Although
the court stated that it was "not certain what law Wisconsin would apply in this case," it
concluded that the choice was logically limited to either the law of Michigan or the District of
Columbia. Id.
44. 431 F. Supp. at 1331-32. The court found the qualified privilege in Timmis v. Bennett,
352 Mich. 355, 89 N.W.2d 748 (1958). The privilege covered "statements made in good faith by
a citizen .. .having or claiming to have special knowledge .. .bearing on [a] matter of public
concern and communicated to others concerned or interested." Id. at 369, 89 N.W.2d at 755.
The Hutchinson v. Proxmire court did not address whether the fair comment defense exists in
Michigan and applies to the case, even though strong Michigan authority for a fair comment
was present in Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mdich. 353, 359, 83 N.W. 110, 112 (1900).
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Agreeing that Hutchinson was a public figure, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed without reaching the issue of fair
comment.' On appeal, the Supreme Court also ignored the fair comment
issue,4 but reversed the appellate court's decision that Hutchinson was a
public figure. 7 The Court reasoned that public interest in Hutchinson's work
was limited to a few professionals in his field, and that mere receipt of pub-
lic money is insufficient by itself to transform a person into a public
figure."5 The Court noted that Hutchinson's only access to the press was to
respond to the Golden Fleece Award, 9 and held that a defendant could not
create a public figure simply by leveling defamatory charges." Having de-
molished the bulwarks of Proxmire's defense,5 the Court remanded the case
to the district court for a new trial.52
Unfortunately, neither the appellate court nor the Supreme Court concen-
trated on fair comment, although the subject was briefly raised in the trial
court.' Yet, Senator Proxmire's jibes about Dr. Hutchinson's "personal for-
tune" and his "perhaps duplicative" work were the only statements that
could arguably be considered defamatory falsehoods. Every other statement
was Proxmire's opinion. Had any of the courts carefully evaluated the appli-
cability of fair comment to the case, they would have discovered it to be
45. 579 F.2d at 1035. The court did not address the district court's holding that Hutchinson
was a public official.
46. The Court did not consider the fair comment issue because it found an indication in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1035 n.15 (7th Cir. 1979), that the Seventh Circuit
would not affirm a finding of fair comment. The Supreme Court concluded that if the case were
remanded to the trial court for a decision on the state law-fair comment issue, the Seventh
Circuit, on appeal, would reject the state law defense. The Supreme Court therefore held that
justification existed for an immediate decision on the constitutional issues presented, 443 U.S.
at 123, notwithstanding its usual practice of avoiding constitutional issues whenever a dispositive
nonconstitutional ground is available. id. at 122. See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213
U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
47. 443 U.S. at 136. The Court based its decision on an independent examination of the
record, following the view of New York Times that "considerations of effective judicial adminis-
tration requires us to review the evidence in the present record to determine whether it could
constitutionally support a judgment for [the plaintiff]." 376 U.S. at 284-85.
48. 443 U.S. at 136.
49. Id. Hutchinson "did not have regular and continuing access to the media that is one of
the accouterments of having become a public figure." Id. His access was limited to responding
to Proxmire's award, and as such arose after the alleged libel.
50. Despite Hutchinson's acceptance of public money for his studies, the Court held that he
was not a public figure before the alleged libel. His writings reached only a small group of
professionals interested in his research in human behavior. The subject of his studies and pub-
lished works became a controversial matter as a consequence of the Golden Fleece Award and
"those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by
making the claimant a public figure." Id. (citing Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443
U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979)).
51. See note 40 supra.
52. 443 U.S. at 136.
53. 431 F. Supp. at 1331.
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completely dispositive, as shown below."' But the post-New York Times
preoccupation with public officials and public figures obscured the threshold
fair comment issue.
One can only guess how much public debate has been stifled by general
inattentiveness to fair comment and by the Supreme Court's public figure
pirouetting. Because confusion in libel law had already caused Hutchinson v.
Proxmire to languish in court for five years without final decision, Senator
Proxmire was forced to abandon his defense and settle with Dr.
Hutchinson.' The monetary cost to taxpayers was high and the essential
issue of the case remains undecided.
Many libel plaintiffs, including Dr. Hutchinson, should not have a valid
cause of action. Regardless of its scientific merit," Hutchinson's project was
prima facie silly. Senator Proxmire tried to hold accountable the scientist
and the public agencies that funded him. An understanding of why Dr.
Hutchinson and others should have no remedy requires an examination of
the fair comment defense. It will become clear through the following discus-
sion of fair comment that this defense not only may augment the protection
given speech about subjects of public interest, but also can offer an effective
alternative to public figure analysis.
THE OUTLINES OF THE FAIR COMMENT DEFENSE
Fair comment has been a recognized defense to libel actions in Anglo-
American jurisprudence at least since the early nineteenth century. s7 In its
54. The fair comment defense is applied to Hutchinson v. Proxmire in notes 214-217 and
accompanying text infra.
55. A Proxmire spokesman, before the settlement, told this writer that the Senator was
confident of prevailing in the remand of Hutchinson v. Proxmire by using the fair comment
defense. That spokesman also bemoaned the cost of the litigation and the time spent, which he
felt could have been better expended on other business. Telephone interview of Mr. Howard
Shuman, Assistant to Senator William Proxmire, by Charles H. Carman. On Monday, March
24, 1980, as part of the settlement, Proxmire apologized to Hutchinson on the Senate floor. 126
CONG. REC. S2831-32 (1980). Howard Shuman that day announced that, in addition to the
apology, Proxmire would pay Hutchinson $10,000 plus court costs of $5132. The original suit
had sought $8,000,000. Reason exists, however, to doubt the sincerity of Proxmire's apology; it
was clearly far cheaper to settle than to litigate further. Proxmire attorneys, paid from govern-
ment funds, had already spent $124,351 defending the suit, and at least that amount, and
another five years, could have been reasonably expected before the litigation came to rest.
56. The National Academy of Sciences, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
the Navy were interested in the potential of this research for resolving problems associated with
confining humans in close quarters for extended periods of time in space and undersea explora-
tion. 443 U.S. at 117. Since the Golden Fleece Award was given to agencies funding plaintiff's
research, Dr. Hutchinson has received further federal grants. 431 F. Supp. at 1317.
57. Tabart v. Tipper, 170 Eng. Rep. 981 (1808). Lord Ellenborough articulated the justifica-
tion for fair comment as follows:
Liberty of criticism must be allowed or we should have neither purity of taste nor
of morals. Fair discussion is essentially necessary to the truth of history, and the
advancement of science. That publication, therefore I shall never consider as a
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simplest formulation, the modern fair comment defense requires the pres-
ence of five elements: (1) the allegedly defamatory statement must be opin-
ion, not fact; (2) that opinion must be based on truly stated facts; (3) the
opinion cannot be an overly personal attack against the plaintiff; (4) the pro-
tected opinion must relate to a matter of public interest; and (5) the opinion
must not be stated with malice.m Although fair comment appears on first
impression to have only a narrow application, the defense has a longer reach
than it has been afforded. The following sections of this Article discuss in
some detail the elements of the fair comment doctrine, indicating the
breadth of interpretation that the doctrine has been given as well as the
future possible uses of the fair comment defense.
The Protected Statement Must Be Opinion, Not Fact
That pure expressions of opinion are not actionable-" was recognized by
libel, which has for its object, not to injure the reputation of any individual, but to
correct misrepresentations of fact, to refute sophistical reasoning, to expose a vi-
cious taste in literature, or to censure what is hostile to morality.
Id. at 982.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606-610
(1938). For examples of the application of the fair comment doctrine, see Post Pub. Co. v.
Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893) (public acts of a public man may lawfully be subject of fair
comment or criticism); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(fair comment is a complete defense as long as the facts are truly stated, the comment is fair,
and it is an honest expression of the writer's real opinion); Berg v. Printers' Ink Pub. Co., 54 F.
Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (fair comment on matters of public interest is not actionable in
absence of bad faith or bad motive); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908)
(leading case for the minority view which protected false statements of underlying facts if pub-
lished without malice and with a good faith belief that they were true); A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby,
227 Md. 267, 176 A.2d 340 (1961) (to rely on the fair comment defense, facts which are set
forth in the publication must be truly stated, or if they are not set forth, they must be both true
and be so referred to in the publication as to be recognizable and easily accessible); Kapiloff v.
Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975) (defense of fair comment applies so as to include
even opinions based upon false recitations of fact, if such facts are not stated with knowing
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Foley v. Press
Pub. Co., 226 A.D. 535, 235 N.Y. S. 340 (1929) (in order for a publication to be fair comment it
must be based on facts truly stated, free from imputations of corrupt motives not warranted by
the facts, and be an honest expression of the writer's opinion).
The most important split among the authorities has been about the requirement that opinions
be based upon truly stated facts. Most courts, following Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, required that
the facts be truly stated for fair comment to apply. The minority view was expressed in Cole-
man and was relied upon by the Supreme Court in New York Times. However, given the
modern disuse of fair comment, the denominations "majority" and "minority" have little verifi-
able significance.
59. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 118. An opinion which implies the existence of unstated facts
may be actionable if the unstated facts would be actionable. To say, "In my opinion, he's a
murderer," implies that he murdered someone, and the statement is actionable. To say, "He
allowed faulty automobiles to be produced to save $10 apiece; he's a murderer," puts the so-
called opinion in context and is usually not actionable. For the proposition that pure expressions
of opinion are not actionable, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964)
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early fair comment cases' and was reiterated by the Supreme Court in New
York Timese ' and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.62 The Gertz Court saw a cru-
cial difference in judicial treatment of facts and opinions: "However perni-
cious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."' If
there is any doubt that the Court meant "idea" as a synonym for opinion, its
next statement was: "But there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact."" Because the success of a fair comment defense depends upon
distinguishing fact from opinion, making this distinction is the first step for
the defamation defendant.
Distinguishing fact from opinion is sometimes harder than it might seem.
One court suggested that the difference between fact and opinion can usu-
ally be determined as a practical matter. That court would ask a simple
question: "Would an ordinary person, reading the matter complained of, be
likely to understand it as an expression of the writer's opinion or as a dec-
laration of an existing fact?" 65  Some commentators assert that facts are
statements capable of proof as true or false and that statements not capable
of such proof are opinions.' Courts following this approach have, however,
(fair comment must be afforded for an honest expression of opinion based upon privileged as
well as true statements of fact); Golden N. Airways v. Tanana Pub. Co., 218 F.2d 612, 627 (9th
Cir. 1959) (if the statement is the honest expression of the writer's real opinion on the facts
which appear in the publication then the fair comment privilege applies); Howard v. Southern
Cal. Associated Newspapers, 95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 584-85, 213 P.2d 399, 403 (1950) (expressions
of opinions are not actionable if they appear as opinions). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 566 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); Coleman v. MacLennan,
78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Tabart v. Tipper, 170 Eng. Rep. 981 (1808).
61. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Alabama Supreme Court held in New York Times that because
criticism of police conduct was criticism of respondent personally and in his capacity as commis-
sioner of public affairs, it was actionable. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 674-
75, 144 So. 2d 25, 49 (1962). This was unacceptable to the United States Supreme Court
because "the proposition ... strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of
free expression." 376 U.S. at 292. In a footnote the Court continued:
Insofar as the proposition means only that the statements about the police conduct
libeled respondent by implicitly criticizing his ability to run the Police Department,
recovery is also precluded in this case by the doctrine of fair comment .... Since
the Fourteenth Amendment required recognition of the conditional privilege for
honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must be
afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true,
statements of fact. Both defenses are of course defeasible if the public official proves
actual malice, as was not done here.
Id. at 292 n.30.
62. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
63. Id. at 339-40.
64. Id.
65. A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 274, 176 A.2d 340, 343 (1961).
66. A commonly invoked distinction between statements of fact and opinion is as follows:
A statement of fact is one capable of the quality.,of truth or falsity. A statement of
opinion does not have this quality. Shortly speaking, therefore, an opinion is never
true or false in the same sense as a statement of fact. An opinion is a comment on
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been criticized for lack of direct analysis and for circularity of definition.6"
Yet, guidance is required to distinguish facts from opinions, and no court or
commentator has suggested a better formula than asking whether the state-
ment is capable of proof of truth or falsity. Often, courts have not considered
the distinction, and have instead mistakenly evaluated the truth or falsity of
opinions.' Such improper analysis has unnecessarily created spurious pub-
lic official or public figure issues and caused neglect of the fair comment
defense.
The uncertainty surrounding the fact-opinion distinction has left an un-
comfortable legacy of judicial confusion, which has included imprecise jury
instructions.' The difficulty of distinguishing facts from opinions has even
led some courts to abandon the distinction and extend fair comment protec-
tion to criticism based on false "facts" as long as the statements were made
in good faith and the other elements of fair comment have been established.
The murkiness of the fact-opinion distinction was the explicit reason for
adoption of the minority rule in the turn of the century Kansas case 0 that
or an interpretation of fact. It is always related to the facts it purports to interpret.
Depending on its conformity with sound critical standards, the opinion may be
sound or unsound, good or bad, reasonable or unreasonable, but never true or
false.
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 5, § 5.8, at 370.
67. See Titus, Statement of Fact versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair
Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Titus].
68. See- discussion of hidden fair comment cases in text accompanying notes 218-270 infra.
Justice Holmes eloquently admonished those who would hastily interpret words: "A word is not
a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916)).
69. An English judge instructed the jury regarding this element of the defense of fair com-
ment as follows:
So the first question in relation to this defense is: Were these words comment,
"into which he put all the dirt he knew"? Well, now, members of the jury, you may
think that this is not comment, it is simply an allegation of fact. Of course, it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish between a statement of fact which is simply a
statement of fact and one which can also be reasonably regarded as comment, and
that is a question for you in this case, which it is. Again, you may think the ques-
tion ij so difficult that you cannot say, without some doubt lurking in your mind,
whether it is in fact comment or whether it is an allegation of fact.
Grech v. Odhams Press Ltd., [1958] 2 All E.R. 462, 467-68. (C.A.). The appellate court upheld
the jury instructions. Id.
70. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). Although the court's discussion
is fairly abstract, it contains a realistic appraisal of the practical effects of allegedly defamatory
statements:
The distinction between comment and statements of fact cannot always be clear to
the mind. Expression of opinion and judgment have all the force of statements of
fact and pass by insensible gradations into declarations of fact .... What is a charge
of intoxication-an inference from conduct and appearances and therefore fair com-
ment or the statement of a fact? What is the difference between a charge of intox-
ication and the following: "Having appearances which were certainly consistent with
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was the model for the Supreme Court's "actual malice" standard, adopted in
New York Times.7  Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court, fearing a possible
chill of open public debate if an opinion was labeled a fact, rejected the
distinction and adopted a rule protecting non-malicious yet false statements
of fact when the discussion involved a matter of public interest and
concern. 7
The fact-opinion dichotomy has created uncertainty, and the cases reveal
that the analysis must go beyond the allegedly defamatory words that alone
may be inadequate to draw the distinction. The textual context is sometimes
relevant. For example, even a description of the plaintiff's conduct as consti-
tuting a criminal act might not be regarded as a statement of fact. In 1970,
the Supreme Court held that a charge of "blackmail" was, in context, a crit-
icism and not an actionable statement of fact. 3 Conversely, the lack of a
context in the publication may lead to the conclusion that the statement is
fact and not opinion.7" Nevertheless, even when enough facts are provided,
the belief that they had imbibed rather freely of the cup that inebriates. Their
condition in the chapel also led one to such a conclusion." In England this state-
ment is fair comment.
Id. at 737-38, 98 P. at 290-91.
71. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
72. Pearson v. Fairbanks Pub. Co., 413 P.2d 711, 713-14 (Alaska 1966). The allegedly de-
famatory statement was that columnist Drew Pearson was a "garbage man." Id. at 712. It was
unclear whether the opinion was that Pearson was an inferior writer and reporter, or, in its
context, a charge that Pearson reported falsely, or something else. Faced with this situation, the
Alaska Supreme Court felt that the fact-opinion distinction would stifle free debate, and hence
decided to give "actual malice" protection to all statements involving matters of public interest,
reasoning that
[tihe distinction between a fact statement and an opinion or comment is so tenuous
in most instances, that any attempt to distinguish between the two will lead to
needless confusion. The basis for the privilege is that it is in the public interest that
there be reasonable freedom of debate and discussion on public issues. One should
not be deterred from speaking out through the fear that what he gives as his opin-
ion will be construed by a court as inferring, if not actually amounting to, a mis-
statement of fact.
Id. at 714.
73. Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). A real estate developer who
wanted a zoning variance owned another piece of land which the local school board wanted to
purchase to construct a new school. The developer would sell the one property only if his
zoning variance was granted on the other property. At a public meeting, several citizens char-
acterized the developer's bargaining position as "blackmail," and this was duly reported by a
local newspaper along with a full report of the meeting and underlying controversy. Although
blackmail is a crime, the Supreme Court pointed out that the plaintiff had not been charged
with the crime of blackmail, observing that, in context, a reader could not have misunderstood
the statement's intent and reached the conclusion that a crime was alleged. Id. at 14.
74. Few cases exist in which lack of context makes the fact-opinion distinction unclear. One
such case, however, is Lawler v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). This court held that a newsletter which reported that the plaintiff "extracted"
employment fees was libelous. The word "extracted," virtually by itself, cost the defendant a
$45,000 judgment. The court said that rather than being a mere comment on the plaintiff's
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writers must remember that the opinion of another person is a fact, and that
erroneous reporting of another's opinion cannot be cloaked in the writer's
own fair comment privilege."5
In addition to textual context, the circumstances surrounding the state-
ment can be important. Charges that a person was a "scab" and was "a
traitor to his God, his country, his family, and his class" have been held
non-defamatory by the Supreme Court because they were made during a
labor dispute.76 Surrounding circumstances have also protected a statement
that otherwise would have accused plaintiff of mental illness." A similar
reasoning has been applied to protect editorial cartoons, including one show-
ing the plaintiff-county assessor picking a taxpayer's pocket"8 and an illustra-
tion of a hotel with its outside walls propped up by crude braces.Th
Although the difficulty of drawing the fact-opinion distinction persists, a
slowly growing liberality and tolerance for others' expressions may render
activities, this statement was a charge of violation of a state anti-kickback law. Id. at 730. The
rarity of this type of case indicates that courts have generally found it easy to distinguish fact
from opinion even when there is a lack of context in the publication; the fair comment defense
can still be valid in this situation.
75. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.
1964). Fair comment will not allow a defendant to escape liability for defamation by showing
that he was merely reporting defamatory language used by another person. Id. at 871. In
Cepeda, a sportswriter was held liable even though he was only passing on to his readers what
he purportedly learned from other persons.
76. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1974). The Court stated that "[s]uch words were obviously used here in a loose figurative sense
to demonstrate the union's strong disagreement with the views of those workers who oppose
unionization." Id. at 284.
77. Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The court stated: "State-
ments must be viewed in the context in which they are uttered .... [Tihe nature of the audi-
ence hearing the remarks is a key factor in determining whether they are capable of a defama-
tory meaning." Id. at 1329. The court concluded that viewers would not understand the words
"paranoid" and "schizophrenic," the allegedly defamatory words in Fram, to refer to an actual
physiological or mental affliction of the plaintiff; rather, "the average viewer ... would under-
stand them to be what they actually were-a rebuttal and criticism of [plaintiff's] accusations."
Id. at 1330.
78. Thompson v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 325 P.2d 945 (Okla. 1958).
79. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1970). The court
stated, however, that a doctored photograph which purported to be a true picture would pre-
sent a statement of fact for which the fair comment defense would be unavailable. Id. at 867
n.18.
Other statements which have been held to be opinions by the courts include: "Toady,
hypocrite, exploiter," as applied to a writer and lecturer, Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d
910 (2d Cir. 1977); "fascist," as applied to a journalist, Buckley v. Littel, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir.
1976); quotation marks around the word "expert," as applied to a professional art authenticator,
Porcella v. Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962); "Nazi Trojan Horse," as applied to a
magazine, Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942); "pornography," as applied to a novel,
Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); "badly hung" and "commercial" in qual-
ity, as applied to paintings in an art gallery, Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335
(D.C. Ct. App. 1965); and "unsuited," as applied to a high school principal, Kapiloff v. Dunn,
27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
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more judgments for defendants likely in fair comment cases. Courts are now
less willing to unequivocally label statements as "facts." In contrast to mod-
ern decisions,' an early 1800's jury found judgment for a plaintiff called by
the defendant a publisher of "immoral and foolish books, ' ' 8 and an early
twentieth century plaintiff insisted an article stating he "ignored" his public
water bill was actionable.82 In 1904, even a lampoon of a well-known col-
lege English professor, facetiously stating that he was the man to re-write
Shakespeare, was considered actionable and libelous per se. 3 That such
quibbling disputes will no longer take center stage in the development of
libel law is devoutly to be wished. Thus, the remainder of this section will
focus on the presumably more important disputes arising in the contempo-
rary political arena.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church' is a recent politically oriented case
illustrating the continuing imprecision of the fact-opinion distinction. Plain-
tiff Wade Church, then Attorney General of Arizona, proposed the formation
of "people's councils" to be composed of all citizens not represented by the
special interest lobbyists then influencing the Arizona legislature.85 The
editorial writers for the newspaper Arizona Republic alertly saw through
80. See, e.g., Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); notes 84-110 and
accompanying text supra.
81. Tabart v. Tipper, 170 Eng. Rep. 981, 982 (1808).
82. Briarcliff Lodge Hotel v. Citizen-Sentinel Pubs., 260 N.Y. 106, 183 N.E. 193 (1932).
The defendant newspapers, commenting on the fact that the plaintiff was six months late in
paying its public water bills, stated that the plaintiff had "ignored" a bill. Id. at 144, 183 N.E.
at 196. The plaintiff contended that "ignored" was libelous because it meant something more
than "failed to pay;" rather, the hotel contended that it connoted a refusal to pay or neglect. Id.
at 116, 183 N.E. at 197. The court refused, however, to hold that the word "ignored" was
libelous as a matter of law. Id.
83. Triggs v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904). The case is
amusing reading, but almost certainly no longer good authority. Professor Triggs sought public-
ity and for purposes of this litigation would probably be considered a public figure today. Even
under the more conservative fair comment law of 1904, the decision seems wrong because there
appears to have been no false assertion of fact. See notes 116-156 and accompanying text infra.
84. 103 Ariz. 582, 447 P.2d 840 (1968).
85. Id. at 584, 447 P.2d at 871. Mr. Church told an AFL-CIO convention of the influence
upon the legislature of special interest groups, representing the mining, power, construction,
finance, and cattle industries, and, citing his own experience, explained how these groups had
joined together to limit the money available for the public schools. Id. at 583-84, 447 P.2d at
841-42. Mr. Church proposed:
Now, the working people and the people's groups are going to have to do the same
thing. We are going to have to build a council. We are going to have to have
full-time representatives up there at that legislature. We are going to have to watch
it carefully. The P.T.A. ought to have them. The Council of Churches ought to
have them, the labor groups ought to have two or three and those teachers, they
are the ones that got a lot of brains, doggone them, they should be out there,
too....
Id. at 584, 447 P.2d at 842 (emphasis in original).
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Church's proposal-and saw communism.86  The evidence at trial estab-
lished that Church was neither a communist nor a communist
sympathizer."s The majority, however, held that the Republic's innuendoes
and "questions"' might be opinion, and ordered a re-trial with a fair com-
ment instruction.
89
Although the majority ordered a re-trial, the five-man court produced four
opinions. Justice Struckmeyer suggested that the statements sued upon were
statements of fact, not opinion.9" Justice Udall thought the editorial was
86. id. at 585-86, 447 P.2d at 843-44. The article stated in pertinent parts:
NOTHING ILLUSTRATES better the dangerous left-wing ideas of Attorney
General Wade Church than his proposals for the setting up of a "people's council"
in Arizona.
According to Church our legislature is "dominated" by special interest groups
operating from the Adams Hotel in Phoenix .... To "correct" this situation Mr.
Church proposes the selection of a "people's council" which presumably, should tell
the legislature what to do and how to do it....
MR. CHURCH'S "people's council" idea comes straight from the writings of
Karl Marx, the god of "scientific socialism" and the prophet of the International
Communist movement. The same idea was the cornerstone of the philosophy of
Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state. The same idea is the political basis of all
Communist regimes all over the world. The story of Communism in power is essen-
tially a story of the "people's council" idea of government put into practice.
The "people's council" idea is only another name for the Communist technique
of the seizure of power and for the Communist way of enabling a small minority to
control and eventually to rule the huge majority.
"THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL" idea of Attorney General Church is therefore
nothing but a disguised Marxist idea of minority rule over the majority.
We are certain that most Arizonans will resolutely reject Mr. Church's alarming
conceptions of government.
We also sincerely hope that the Arizona labor movement-at whose annual con-
vention last week Mr. Church first voiced his "people's council" proposals-will
have the good sense to disassociate itself completely from such dangerous ideology,
which can only do harm to the rank and file working man.
BUT MR. CHURCH, himself, owes an urgent explanation to the public. He has
to state, publicly and clearly, whether or not his "people's council" proposals are
part and parcel of a general Marxist philosophy of government and of life.
Does Mr. Church advocate socialism for Arizona?
Does he advocate communism?
Does he want "people's councils" to take over our state government in the way
they have taken over the governments of all the unhappy lands behind the Com-
munist Iron Curtain?
Id. (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 592, 447 P.2d at 850.
88. See note 86 supra.
89. Id. at 598, 447 P.2d at 856. Upon retrial, the jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 actual
damages and $235,000 punitive damages against each of three defendants. The decision was
upheld on appeal against two of the three defendants, including Phoenix Newspapers. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Church, 24 Ariz. App. 287, 537 P.2d 1345 (1975).
90. 103 Ariz. at 598, 447 P.2d at 856 (Struckmeyer, J., concurring). Justice Struckmeyer
stated: "It can only be understood to mean that Church was advocating the seizure of power
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clearly opinion " because "a reader is put on notice in the very beginning
that . . . the People's Council . . . is to be operated by an Arizona labor
union." '' The editorial's constant use of the word "communism," he con-
tended, could not be reasonably interpreted-as a factual statement that the
council was to be operated by Communists.' Justice Bernstein argued that
the editorial technically had only demanded that Attorney General Church
clarify his position on communism.94 Because Justice Bernstein felt that
charges of communism against public figures were "common place," he
advocated application of the fair comment defense and consequently the
complaint's dismissal.'
The lesson of Phoenix Newspapers is that possibly libelous statements
should not become too specific. The crux of the case seems to be that the
defendant was found to have alleged advocacy by the plaintiff of a specific
device-the people's council-for a specific, treasonable end-the over-
throw of Arizona's democratic government. Because it is so difficult to im-
agine that many readers believed Church was calling for communism in Ari-
zona, the result seems wrong; but the case illustrates that the specificity of a
possibly libelous charge will have a bearing on whether the finder of fact
calls the statement "fact" or "opinion."
Two cases involving pop conservative William F. Buckley, Jr. also demon-
strate that specific allegedly libelous words are likely to be labeled as fact,
and that more general words are more likely to be called opinion. The first
of the cases, Buckley v. Littell,- arose when Dr. Franklin H. Littell's book,
Wild Tongues, was found by the district court to have libeled Buckley in
three ways:
[F]irst, by labeling Buckley as a "fellow traveler" of "fascism"
[slecond, by saying that he acts as a "deceiver" and uses his journalistic
position to spread materials from "openly fascist journals" under the guise
of responsible conservatism . . . [t]hird, by accusing Buckley of engaging
in the same kind of libelous journalism as Westbrook Pegler practiced
against Quentin Reynolds. 7
Regarding the charge that Buckley was "a fellow traveler" of "fascism," the
trial court heard extensive testimony about the imprecision of the word
through unlawful acts in the same manner as did the Communists, thereby destroying the
democratic government of Arizona." Id.
91. Id. at 601, 477 P.2d at 860 (Udall, Jr., concurring and dissenting). Justice Udall con-
curred in the decision, but dissented from the majority's ruling that the editorial was libelous
per se.
92. Id. at 601, 447 P.2d at 859.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 605, 447 P.2d at 863 (Bernstein, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976). This case makes interesting reading because the parties are
personally antagonistic, hostile, and downright feuding.
97. Id. at 887.
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"fascist."" The court found the charge non-actionable, being so vague as to
be "insusceptible to proof of truth or falsity."" The nebulous nature of
labels also compelled the circuit court to reverse the trial court on the sec-
ond count; calling Buckley a "deceiver" who spread material from "openly
fascist journals" was again held to be insufficiently precise to constitute
libel. 100
The basis for the third segment of Buckley's suit was Littell's statement
that "[l]ike Westbrook Pegler, who lied day after day in his column about
Quentin Reynolds and goaded him into a lawsuit, Buckley could be taken to
court by any one of several people who had enough money to hire compe-
tent legal counsel and nothing else to do." 0 The court held that statement
to be an assertion of fact, and ruled that it could not be redeemed simply
because it was made in the context of a philosophical or political debate. The
98. "Fascism" was found to be a term with as many shades of meaning as the number of
people who use it. Buckley himself, in attempting to define "fascist," made an extended state-
ment which involved a circle where the most extreme right and extreme left met, and which
contained at some point every possible shade of left and right. Id. at 893. The court's opinion is
informative on the fact-opinion distinction and the practical problems this distinction presents in
litigation:
Appellee himself was acutely aware of the element of opinion involved in such loose
terminology. The following exchange occurred in cross-examination of him relative
to his having called Littell an "abusive rhetorician," after he testified that he did so
because "[t]o say ... that [Edgar] Bundy [of the Church League of America] is part
of the fascist underworld is simply abusive":
Q. But that's just your opinion, correct?
A. [Buckley] What do you mean my opinion?
Q. That he was abusive, that Dr. Littell's letter is abusive.
A. Is there an opposite to an opinion in something like this? In my opinion as
distinguished from my what?
Q. That's just your opinion. You can answer yes or no.
A. No, I can't. You are playing rhetorical games with me and I choose not to
submit. Do you mean is there a Bureau of Labor of Standards or FDA on the basis
of which one can measure what is abusive?
Id. at 893 n.9.
99. Id. at 894. The court added:
The use of "fascist," "fellow traveler," and "radical right" as political labels in
Wild Tongues cannot be regarded as having been proved to be statements of fact,
among other reasons, because of the tremendous imprecision of the meaning and
usage of these terms in the realm of political debate, an imprecision which is simply
echoed in the book.
Id. at 893. The court also distinguished between being labeled a communist and being accused
of being a member of the Communist Party. Id. at 894. This is another illustration of general
charges ("communist") being regarded as opinion while specific charges ("party member") are
regarded as fact. Although such a distinction is supportable because of the need to draw a line
somewhere between actionable assertions of fact and non-actionable statements of opinion, it
seems reasonable to believe that the actual harm to plaintiff would be about the same, regard-
less of the niceties of expression.
100. Id. at 895. Calling a journalist a "deceiver" may be a fact statement, and a serious
charge against a journalist. The court determined it was opinion, however, and proceeded to
the third charge.
101. Id.
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court assigned particular weight to the comparison to Pegler and stated that
this was plainly a factual accusation that Buckley engaged in libelous
journalism. 11
By using different language, Littell probably could have avoided liability
and leveled a similar and equally powerful charge. Because the comparison
to a notorious and proven libeler such as Pegler was so important to the
court, deletion of the offending analogy probably would have protected Lit-
tell. Evidence of Buckley columns that had been proved libelous (there was
no such evidence) would have probably saved Littell from judgment. Alter-
natively, if Littell had said "should be taken to court" instead of "could be
taken to court," the slight change might have influenced the court to find
that statement to be an opinion. In terms of avoiding libel, Dr. Littell was
less than artful in his harangue; he should have taken lessons from Mr.
Buckley.
Buckley v. Vidal'' also illustrates the importance of avoiding specificity.
After Buckley sued writer Gore Vidal,"' Vidal counterclaimed because Buck-
ley had called Vidal's book, Myra Breckinridge, pornography.' 5 Buckley
also said that Vidal was not a real political commentator,'06 at a time when
Vidal was so employed. Although the court did not explicitly analyze the
fact-opinion distinction relative to Buckley's charge of "pornography," the
court did assume that the case was proper for fair comment' °7 because Buck-
ley's charge of "pornography" was an opinion.' 8 Despite Buckley's state-
ment about Vidal's credentials as a political commentator, the court also held
those comments to be opinion and therefore protected under the law of fair
comment."' Vidal's claims against Buckley's general charges thus could not
102. Id. Proving that the charge of libelous journalism was false was essential to Buckley's
case. The court held that "[gliven the proof of falsity which was presented was not successfully
rebutted, it is constitutionally as well as tortiously defamatory." Id. at 896.
103. 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
104. Buckley sued Vidal following remarks made by Vidal on network television. Id. at 1052.
105. Id. Mr. Buckley had made two identical statements, once on television and once in a
magazine article: "Let Myra Breckinridge go back to his pornography." Id. Buckley was clearly
referring to Vidal by the name "Myra Breckinridge." The court said that because the "novel
... deals quite graphically and at some considerable length with a wide range of sexual in-
terests, acts and perversions, not the least of which include transvestitism, bestiality and mutila-
tion .. . no jury could reasonably find that Buckley's comments about the book were unfair."
Id. at 1054.
106. Id. at 1052. In an August 1968 television broadcast, Buckley stated: "I do not think it is
right to present Mr. Gore Vidal as a political commentator of any consequence since he is
nothing more than a literary producer of perverted Hollywood-minded prose." Id.
107. The court discussed the elements of fair comment, saying that a "critic enjoys a priv-
ilege to make such critical comments as long as the comment does not go beyond the published
work itself to attack the author personally, . . . the facts are truly stated, . . . the comment is
fair, . . .and the comment is an honest expression of the writer's real opinion." Id. at 1052-53
(citations omitted).
108. Id. at 1053.
109. Id. at 1055.
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withstand a motion for summary judgment."' The recurring lesson for
would-be knife-twisters who would use the shield of fair comment is that
general charges are safer than specific charges. A phrase like "producer of
perverted Hollywood-minded prose""' is so general that it must be opinion,
because it is incapable of being proved true or false.
Similar reasoning can be applied to Hutchinson v. Proxmire. Although the
point was not decided, both the court of appeals"' and the Supreme Court..
intimated that Proxmire's only actionable statements were that Hutchinson
"made a fortune from his monkeys" and that his research was "perhaps
duplicative." "' Neither phrase, ambiguous and qualified as they are, is ca-
pable of being proved true or false. Because the case has been settled out of
court, there will, of course, be no definitive ruling on the point. Neverthe-
less, for these words to be actionable they probably would have to be loaded
with more baggage than they could carry. To say that examinations of "cray-
fish, wasps, boa constrictors, turtles, alligators, oppossums, foxes, pigeons,
monkeys and humans" "s to discover when they appear angry is "perhaps
duplicative" seems to be a reasonable and restrained opinion. The first ele-
ment of fair comment therefore applies to Hutchinson v. Proxmire.
Some defense attorneys may approach fair comment tentatively because of
the lack of certainty regarding the line between fact and opinion. One can,
however, be fairly comfortable using the formula that a statement of opinion
is one that cannot be proved true or false. When opinion statements are
treated as fact statements, erroneous analysis can lead to undesirable results.
In a libel action involving an opinion, use of defenses other than fair
comment-such as the truth defense, the various privileges, and public fig-
ure or official-makes no sense.
The Opinion Must Be Based upon Truly Stated Facts
To successfully assert the defense of fair comment, it is not enough that
the statement be an opinion. In addition, the opinion must be based upon
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1052. One can assume that if Buckley had claimed that Vidal's work "turned my
ten year old neighbor into a homosexual," or made any other similar statement of fact, then
Buckley would have had to prove the truth of the statement. "[P]roducer of perverted Holly-
wood-minded prose," however, purple and petulant as it is, still is so vague that it cannot
reasonably be proven true or false.
112. 579 F.2d at 1035 n.15.
113. 443 U.S. at 115.
114. The phrase "perhaps duplicative" is not the same as "duplicative." "Perhaps" is used
when one wants to leave room for doubt. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLIsH nLANCUAGE 1679 (1976). Given the facts of the case, however, even an unqualified
statement that the research was duplicative might not have been actionable.
As to Dr. Hutchinson's "fortune," Proxmire's apology in the Senate shows that Hutchinson
wanted to establish at trial that Proxmire's statement contained an innuendo of "personal for-
tune." 126 CONG. REC. S2831 (daily ed. March 24, 1980). Fortune however, does not mean just
personal fortune, and Hutchinson's grants and personal income might easily seem a fortune to
an average middle-income juror.
115. 579 F.2d at 1038.
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truly stated facts.' This requirement allows readers or listeners to separate
fact from opinion, know the basis for the opinion given, and conclude for
themselves whether it is defamatory. For example," 7 a statement 8 that a
man is "a disgrace to human nature" is probably a defamatory allegation. If,
however, a speaker states, "He murdered his father, and therefore is a dis-
grace to human nature," the opinion is now derived from stated facts which,
if true, will satisfy this second requirement of the fair comment doctrine.
Thus, when the underlying facts are set forth in a story itself, the writer's
conclusion is clearly opinion and the basis for that opinion is so evident that
even words like "blackmail" and "traitor""' are not actionable. Indeed, in
Gandia v. Pettingill,2° where the facts were set forth and the plaintiff's con-
duct was subsequently described as "a monstrous immorality, a scandal,
etc., etc.," 121 the Supreme Court found no liability for defamation. Striking
to the heart of the case, Justice Holmes wrote that "what really hurt the
plaintiff was not the comment but the fact." 2
Few recent cases address the requirement that the facts be stated, prob-
ably because the courts implicitly endorse the notion that it is enough if
facts are readily available to anyone who would inquire further. Yet, vestiges
of a less liberal interpretation" persisted as recently as 1961.' In that case,
116. See note 58 supra.
117. Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 A.D. 535, 545, 235 N.Y.S. 340, 352 (1929) (quoting C.
GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER (2d Ed. 1929). Similar reasoning was also applied in Julian v.
American Bus. Consultants, 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1, 139 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956), although the
result in that case is repulsive even for one who believes in an unrestricted free press.
118. The statement, of course, need not be oral. The mode of statement's communication is
not important. See note 16 supra.
119. See notes 73 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
120. 222 U.S. 452 (1911).
121. Id. at 457.
122. Id. at 458.
123. A turn of the century case decided by the Michigan Supreme Court illustrates the less
liberal interpretation of the truly stated facts rule. In Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83
N.W. 110 (1900), fair comment was held inapplicable to defendants who claimed that the plain-
tiff, a state legislator, had "championed measures opposed to the moral interests of the com-
munity." Id. at 354, 83 N.W. at 111. Neither was fair comment available when vituperation was
heaped upon one of the plaintiff's ticket-mates and the defendant exhorted his readers to vote
against the plaintiff "for reasons we consider equally as good." Id. at 357, 83 N.W. 112. The
court believed that the first statement was not protected by fair comment because it "afforded
no one an opportunity to judge whether the statement was a proper deduction from the facts
upon which it was based or not." Id. at 360, 83 N.W. at 113. The second statement was not
protected because, according to the court, the plaintiff "was represented to be a man of bad
morals, and unworthy of support for that reason." Id. at 362, 83 N.W. at 114. Sounder legal
reasoning appeared in the dissent, which pointed out that the plaintiff's voting history was a
matter of public record available to any interested person, and that there was no direct com-
parison to plaintiff's "bad" ticket-mate. Id. at 368, 83 N.W. at 116 (Grant, J., dissenting). To
the dissenters, the availability of the voting record was sufficient factual basis for the first state-
ment. Id. Regarding the second statement, the dissent noted that "the plain inference is that
the reasons are not the same but, in the opinion of the writers, 'equally as good.' The language
speaks for itself." Id. at 362, 83 N.W. at 114.
124. A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 176 A.2d 340 (1961). The Baltimore City Delega-
tion to the Maryland Legislature attempted to remove the Baltimore Police Commissioner
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a man was labeled "infamous" in a newspaper editorial that stated none of
the underlying facts. The dissent would have accepted a fair comment de-
fense because of the plaintiff's well-known "illegal, disgraceful, and repre-
hensible course of conduct,""9 but the majority rejected the defense, point-
ing to the absence of underlying facts in the story itself. ' Because the trial
court did not allow facts in the public record into evidence or allow testi-
mony as to those facts, one commentator has suggested that judicial notice of
the plaintiffs' notoriety should be taken.'
The more liberal majority rule is, however, that underlying facts in a fair
comment case need not be specifically set forth but need only be available;
the reasonableness of this rule becomes clear in cases dealing with criticism
of artistic or creative works because the works themselves comprise the
underlying facts. 8 For example, fair comment has been held applicable
when an art gallery was criticized for the quality of its paintings and the way
the paintings were hung."9 The modern rule sweeps broader than artistic
works so that in a libel suit based on an editorial critical of a judge, the
court held that a mere reference in the editorial to the source of the under-
lying facts was sufficient.' 30
under provisions of the Maryland state constitution that empowered the Governor to remove
civil officers for incompetence and misconduct. Id. at 270, 176 A.2d at 341. After the Governor
exonerated the commissioner, the Baltimore Sun newspaper ran an editorial headlined "Not
Proved" and containing the statement: "Every important witness against the Police Commis-
sioner, moreover, was a man with a motive. We name especially the infamous Kirby." Id. at
271, 176 A.2d at 342.
125. Id. at 286, 176 A.2d at 350 (Prescott, J., dissenting). Judge Prescott further stated:
Most, if not all, of this was aired in the public press and was readily accessible to
the public at large. The record discloses that Kirby's name appeared no less than
183 times in 65 newspaper articles offered in evidence; 23 times his name was in
headlines, and three times his photograph accompanied the articles.
To me, the above clearly establishes the fact that Kirby was "infamous" and "a
man with a motive."
Id. at 288, 176 A.2d at 351. Judge Prescott concluded that, if anything, this evidence not only
established a factual basis for an opinion, but proved the opinion's truth. Id. at 291, 176 A.2d at
352.
126. Id. at 284, 176 A.2d at 349. On this point, the court concluded: "There is nothing in the
editorial to lead the reader to reasons why the writer thought Kirby was infamous or a man with
a motive, or why the reader should." Id.
127. Note, Libel from Comment on Facts Generally Known: A.S. Abell Company v. Kirby,
23 MD. L. REv. 76, 83 (1963).
128. See, e.g., Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding for de-
fendant who commented derogatorily on plaintiff's book, although defendant "made no assertion
of fact .. . except perhaps for the fact that Vidal is the author of Myra Breckinridge"). The
Restatement of Torts stated that "[tihe facts upon which the opinion is based must be stated or
they must be known or readily available to the persons to whom the comment or criticism is
addressed." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 606, Comment b (1938).
129. Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965). The court stated:
"So long as the facts are available to the public, the criticism is within the doctrine of fair
comment." Id. at 338.
130. Cohalan v. New York Tribune, Inc., 172 Misc. 20, 15 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
The court held that factual basis of the criticism that a judge had "displayed a lack of judicial
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If the underlying facts are set forth, writers and publishers will be fairly
safe in making powerful statements without risking liability for libel. In Por-
celia v. Time, Inc.,'31 Life magazine reported on shady art authenticators,
relating various purported "discoveries" of "lost" paintings and concentrating
on the "finds" of one Amadore Porcella. Using only skillful ordering of the
facts and quotation marks around some key words, 3 1 the story established
Porcella as a charlatan. Despite the damage to Porcella, the court found the
"description of the entire setting in which he was active" to be an ample
basis for the defendant's opinions, which were therefore protected by fair
comment." Similarly, a high school principal who was rated "unsuited" for
his position was held unable to recover because the defendants had set forth
the criteria for their rating and a reader could decide for himself whether
the opinion was "valid." 13
Even when the facts underlying an opinion are set forth or readily avail-
able, excessive vituperation apparently can overwhelm the facts and cancel
their value in establishing the truly stated facts element. The problem arises
but is not directly answered in Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church.i  Ear-
lier articles in the newspaper had reported the plaintiff-attorney general's
proposals for counterbalancing the influence of existing state lobbies. A later
editorial referred to Attorney General Church's advocacy of "people's
councils" 13 and stated that "Mr. Church thinks that this 'people's council'
should be organized and run by Arizona's labor unions.""' Because these
fact statements were followed by hundreds of words comparing Church's
idea with communism, the majority felt that the reference to the labor un-
ions did not prevent the balance of the editorial from being a statement of
fact that charged Church with advocacy of communist ideas and methods. 13
Intensity and length of the opinion therefore transformed it, in the court's
opinion, into a statement of fact.
temperament and .. . [had] exhibited marked signs of prejudice against a litigant appearing
before him" was not required to be within the four corners of the allegedly libelous editorial.
"It is sufficient that the facts upon which the comment or criticism is based are referred to in
the editorial, book review, or article." Id. at 21, 22, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
131. 300 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962).
132. Id. at 163-65. Normally mundane words such as "remarkable talent," "masterpieces,"
and "expert" attained critical meaning through their emphasis in context. Id.
133. Id. at 166. The court also found the article non-libelous on the basis of the Illinois
innocent construction rule. Id. at 167. That rule holds that "if language is capable of innocent
construction it should be read and declared non-libelous." Crosby v. Time, Inc., 254 F.2d 927,
929-30 (7th Cir. 1958).
134. Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907
(1976).
135. 103 Ariz. 582, 447 P.2d 840 (1968).
136. id. at 585, 447 P.2d at 843-44.
137. Id.
138. See note 86 supra.
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When the underlying facts are found to be untrue, the fair comment de-
fense will be dismissed, as it was in Goldwater v. Ginzburg.a  In Ginz-
burg, the court rejected fair comment without deciding whether the conclu-
sions of the defendant's magazine articles were fact or opinion, "' because
those conclusions were based upon untrue statements of facts. A defendant
who erroneously but in good faith believes that his statement of underlying
facts is true at one time had no defense."' In 1889, a theater critic who
implied incorrect facts into a play was held accountable; the play had not
contained the adultery the critic thought he saw.' Most modern applica-
139. 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1049 (1970). Defendant Ginzburg, editor and publisher of Fact magazine, turned his Octo-
ber 1, 1964 issue into "A Special Issue on the Mind of Barry Goldwater." Id. at 785. Ginzburg
sent 12,356 questionnaires to psychiatrists. The survey asked the psychiatrists to check "yes" or
"no" as to whether they thought Goldwater was mentally fit to serve as President, and solicited
other comments the respondents might have. Of a mere 2417 replies, 571 psychiatrists stated
they could draw no conclusion about Goldwater's fitness and only 668 of all responses were
signed. 414 F.2d at 334. A cover letter to the questionnaire falsely stated that Goldwater had
suffered two mental breakdowns. Id. at 330. There was much other evidence at the trial that
pointed to a rather obvious conclusion: Fact intended to prove, by whatever means, that Gold-
water suffered from a mental illness rendering him unfit to be President.
140. 261 F. Supp. at 784. The court recognized the fact-opinion question was difficult, and
stated that "even if all the statements were opinions only, proof of actual malice would take
away from defendants the privilege conferred by the Sullivan principle." Id. at 787. The case is
a rare example of a public official plaintiff proving "actual malice." The district court, using the
New York Times v. Sullivan framework, may not have been precise in its analysis, although its
result was correct. The court was probably right that the fair comment defense was defeasible
on a finding of "actual malice," but the cart was in front of the horse because the truth of the
underlying facts had not been established and it is highly doubtful that they could have been.
In short, nothing had been established to "defease." The "actual malice" spoken of by the
district court, however, did concern the issue of truth or falsity. Therefore, it is evident that
New York Times and its progency have had some impact on the application of the truth and
malice requirements of fair comment. The law is yet unsettled; the implications are discussed in
the text accompanying notes 193-213 infra.
141. Today, a defense is available even for false statements of fact. When the plaintiff is a
public official or public figure, false statements of fact are constitutionally privileged if not made
with "actual malice," which has been defined as follows:
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained se-
rious doubts as to the truth or falsity of his publication. Publishing with such doubts
shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. [This
test] permits the issue to be determined by the defendant's testimony that he pub-
lished the statement in good faith and unaware of its probable falsity.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Even when the plaintiff is a private person,
he or she must show at least negligence, or else the false statement of fact will be protected.
See notes 193-213 and accompanying text infra. In some states, "actual malice" is required even
when the plaintiff is a private person. See, e.g., AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Pub. Co., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1975).
142. Merivale v. Carson, 20 .Q.B.D. 271 (1887). The defendant-reviewer of plaintiff-author's
play disliked a character and referred to her as "the naughty wife and her double existence." Id.
at 276. A jury concluded that this innuendo meant that the character was adulterous, that the
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tions of this principle are more favorable to defendants, but, while normally
protected, even a slip in the facts can be damaging to a defendant. In Wes-
tropp v. E.W. Scripps Co.,' a newspaper editorial harshly attacked several
judges who, by granting a series of continuances requested by the defense,
freed a criminal defendant who subsequently ran amuck. "4 The plaintiff in
the case was a judge who had granted one continuance, but had granted it at
the prosecution's request. Even though the same newspaper correctly re-
ported on the same page that the plaintiff had not given any continuance to
the defendant, the court was stern: "No untruth can be the basis of fair
criticism." 14
Where the words or works of another are paraphrased, edited, summa-
rized, or changed, fair comment is still a feasible defense as long as the
original meaning remains. "' While actions brought solely upon a misre-
ported interview "7 are rare, suits have been brought alleging a misquote
where tangible evidence of plaintiff's original words or work was available.
In one case, "' although there was no question that a book reviewer had
altered an author's spoken words, fair comment was nevertheless held ap-
plicable. "That the 'quotes' are not word-for-word -indeed, they are mod-
ified on occasion-nor always complete, does not make them facts not 'truly
stated.' "Ia As long as the quoted subject's meaning is substantially stated,
author failed to express any opinion as to the wife's morality, and that the failure to condemn an
adulterous character reflected poorly upon the writer's own character.
143. 148 Ohio 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947).
144. Id. at 366-67, 74 N.E.2d at 342. While awaiting trial, the defendant exchanged gunfire
with a policeman, resulting in the death of both. The defendant was carrying a large sum of
money; the car he was driving contained a body in the trunk; and defendant possessed stolen
goods. Id. at 367-68, 74 N.E.2d at 342-43. The editorial highlighted the defendant's notoriety
and long criminal record and intimated that the continuance was the result of political string-
pulling or expert manipulation by the defendant's attorney. Id. at 367, 74 N.E.2d at 342.
145. Id. at 377, 74 N.E.2d at 346. The plaintiff was one of several judges who had granted
continuance in the case; the other judges had granted continuances on defense motions, but
Westropp had granted only one, and that was for the prosecutors.
146. See, e.g., Simonson v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
147. As a general rule, a person is subject to liability for repetition of a libel or slander
originally published by another. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 116. An important exception to this
this rule is provided by the common law privilege of fair report. This privilege protects one who
in good faith and without malice publishes a fair and accurate report of a slander made in the
course of an official public proceeding. See Kirby v. Pittsburgh Courier Pub. Co., 150 F.2d 480
(2d Cir. 1945); Cressen v. Louisville Courier-Journal, 299 F. 487 (6th Cir. 1924); Lulay v.
Peoria Journal Star, Inc., 34 II!. 2d 112, 214 N.E.2d 746 (1966); Shriver v. Valdosta Press, 82
Ga. App. 406, 61 S.E.2d 221 (1950). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977);
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 118, at 830-31; Sowles, Defamation and the First Amendment: The
Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1979).
148. Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
149. Id. at 1050. There was no doubt that the reviewer had modified the plaintiff's words,
but the court held that fair comment applied. The court stated: "[T]he 'quotes' come substan-
tially from the book, from statements made by plaintiff in public meetings, and from a magazine
article referring to plaintiff's writings. Thus, the requirement that the facts be 'truly stated' is
met." Id.
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the "facts truly stated" requirement is met." ° Similarly, the district court in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire held that "selective reporting will not support a
finding of reckless disregard for the truth. Summarizing plaintiff's research
... will not rise to the level of falsification." 151
Opinions that need to be protected by fair comment cannot safely be
based on other opinions, as Walter O'Malley discovered when he called a
doctor's operation on the Brooklyn Dodger catcher, Roy Campenella, "un-
necessary" and further asserted that the surgeon thought he was "operating
on Roy's bankroll." 152 O'Malley had based his statements on the medical
opinions of other doctors, but the court in Shenkman v. O'Malley'-' held that
"fair comment . . . has never been applied to an opinion expressed and
based upon the opinions of others."" O'Malley is a warning against blind
adherence to the fair comment defense formula.1m
Still, some opinions are more safely reported than others. Legal decisions
are called "opinions," yet are more or less authoritative depending on the
court rendering them. Sometimes the best knowledge on a subject is an
informed opinion; this is true of many medical matters. Although the re-
ported cases do not suggest a pressing need for another rule, creation of a
rule that protects opinions based upon the "best available information" or
upon true facts appears more in line with the main purpose of the fair com-
ment defense, promoting discussion of matters of public interest. This rule
would avoid one result in O'Malley: on remand, the jury must decide
whether, in its opinion, the operation on Campenella was necessary."
Opinions Protected by Fair Comment Cannot Contain
Overly Personal Attacks
A general rule of fair comment is that published matter may relate to a
person's public acts or works but may not follow him into his private life by
attacking his personality or motives.'5 7 That general rule is subject to two
150. Id. (quoting Briarcliff Lodge Hotel v. Citizen-Sentinel Pubs., 260 N.Y. 106, 118-19, 183
N.E. 193, 197 (1932)) ("a fair and true report admits of some liberality; the exact words of every
proceeding need not be given if the substance be substantially stated").
151. 431 F. Supp. at 1329. This finding was not addressed by either the court of appeals or
the Supreme Court.
152. Shenkman v. O'Malley, 2 A.D.2d 567, 571, 157 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294 (1956).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 572, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
155. Cf. Fizjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 228 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1950) (the report of the
opinion of another person held to be a statement of fact). See also Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines
& Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1964).
156. See Titus, supra note 67, at 1234-35.
157. See Berg v. Printer's Ink Pub. Co., 54 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Cohalan v. New
York Tribune, Inc., 172 Misc. 20, 15 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Exner v. American Medical
Ass'n, 12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974); Tabart v. Tipper, 170 Eng. Rep. 981 (1808).
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major qualifications. First, criticism of personality or motive may be pro-
tected by fair comment if such criticism can be reasonably inferred from
truly stated facts. 58 Second, an attack on a public work that necessarily
raises defamatory inferences about personality or motive will be
protected."s As long as the critic is primarily referring to the creative work,
the work's creator cannot complain about whatever shortcomings may "rub
off" on him or her. 1w
Although the general rule against overly personal attacks is flexible
enough to fit a variety of circumstances, courts vary in their willingness or
ability to separate personal attacks from criticism of creative work. When
Gore Vidal complained that William F. Buckley, Jr. had not very indirectly
labeled him a pornographer by calling his book, Myra Breckinridge, "por-
nography," the court upheld Buckley's claim of fair comment.' Likewise,
when a defendant-book reviewer said that he was most bothered by the
"seeming hypocrisy" of plaintiff's book, the court was unmoved by the
necessary implication that the author was being called a hypocrite. The court
held that the phrase "seeming hypocrisy" was a comment on the book's con-
tents and was not aimed at the plaintiff personally.' One state court,
however, refused to hold that a defendant's labeling of plaintiff's painting as
"obscene" did not reflect on the plaintiff-painter, and consequently rejected
the asserted fair comment defense."
Although some uncertainty exists concerning the extent to which an attack
can criticize a person's private affairs and not be held libelous, the problem
is more theoretical than real. The forbidden "personal" boundary is drawn
158. Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 A.D.
535, 235 N.Y.S. 340 (1929); Cohalan v. New York Tribune, Inc., 172 Misc. 20, 15 N.Y.S.2d 58
(Sup. Ct. 1939); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943).
159. See Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Buckley
v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281
(1908).
160. See, e.g., Berg v. Printers' Ink Pub. Co., 54 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). In Berg,
the court stated that "[piractically every word of the [criticism] is aimed at the writings; and
while the criticism may indirectly strike the plaintiff, it does so only because the plaintiff was
the author of the works criticized." Id. at 804.
161. Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court recognized that an
allegation that a book is pornography suggests that the author is a pornographer. Id. at 1053.
The court took a practical approach, however, stating: "[S]uch necessary implications of com-
ments directed at the work itself are not sufficient to turn otherwise protected criticism into
unprotected criticism. If the rule were otherwise, the privilege of fair comment would cease to
exist." Id. (emphasis added).
162. Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
163. Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 180, 129 A.2d 148, 157 (1957). Mayor D'Alesan-
dro of Baltimore had ordered plaintiff's painting removed from a public exhibit, calling it
obscene. A motion to dismiss by the defendant-mayor alleging plaintiff's failure to state a cause
of action was denied. The court stated: "Though we think the question a close one, we cannot
say as a matter of law that it does not constitute a reflection on the character of an artist, and
not merely on his work, to say that he has painted an obscene picture." Id.
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by the nature of the story being reported, and reporters and commentators
are usually aware of their privilege's limits.' If the matter commented
upon is found to be of public interest, many personal criticisms will still fall
within the ambit of opinion protected by fair comment. " Further, one who
speaks or performs in public must face the consequent criticism. In this
respect, the fair comment rule against personal attacks is analogous to the
"actual malice" standard as that standard is applied to criticism of public
figures.66 In both situations, the plaintiff, by availing himself of a public
forum, has invited criticism of his or her actions. 6 r Thus, courts rarely hold
criticism to be overly personal.
In light of these principles, Senator Proxmire's statements were not overly
personal attacks on Dr. Hutchinson. Proxmire's newsletters and press re-
leases stating that Hutchinson's research was "perhaps duplicative" and that
Hutchinson had "made a fortune" from his monkeys related to Hutchinson's
federally funded research."" The argument that these criticisms go beyond
Hutchinson's public actions and into his personal life is not supported by the
164. But see McKee v. Robert, 197 A.D. 842, 189 N.Y.S. 502 (1921) (defendant who circu-
lated pamphlet criticizing plaintiff newspaper editor in response to an article criticizing defend-
ant consulted attorney before going ahead with publication, but was nevertheless held liable).
165. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). In commenting on
the common sense of the public in interpreting criticism of public persons, the court observed
that "the people have good authority for believing that grapes do not grow on thorns, nor figs
on thistles." ld. at 739, 98 P. at 291. See also Howard v. Southern Cal. Associated Newspapers,
95 Cal. App. 2d 580, 213 P.2d 399 (1950) (plaintiff and his mayoral recall movement charac-
terized as "mala fide," "sinister," a "disgrace to Glendale," and a "dangerous and unjust
element"-not too personal); Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 A.D. 535, 538, 235 N.Y.S. 340,
345-46 (1929) (a charge that a technical aide to the Secretary of Navy had conspired "to rig
testimony," "do a little fixing," and "whitewash" a Navy investigation held not too personal);
Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 263 A.D. 403, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1942) (description of plaintiff-
Congressman as "hardly dry behind the ears" and part of a younger generation whose softening
was not "necessarily in the muscles"--not too personal), affd, 296 N.Y. 714, 70 N.E.2d 537
(1946).
166. See discussion of the public interest component of fair comment in text accompanying
notes 170-192 infra. See also discussion of public figures in text accompanying notes 23-31
supra.
167. See, e.g., Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901). The Des
Moines Leader reviewed the Cherry sisters' stage show as follows:
Effie is an old jade of 50 summers, Jessie a frisky filly of 40, and Addie, the flower
of the family, a capering monstrosity of 35. Their long skinny arms, equipped with
talons at the extremities, swung mechanically, and anon waived frantically at the
suffering audience. The mouths of their rancid features opened like caverns, and
sounds like the wailings of damned souls issued therefrom.
Id. at 299, 86 N.W. at 323. The cruel reviewer wrote more in the same vein, but the court was
not dainty either:
One who goes upon the stage to exhibit himself to the public, or who gives any
kind of a performance to which the public is invited, may be freely criticised. He
may be held up to ridicule, and entire freedom of expression is guarantied dramatic
critics .... If there ever was a case justifying ridicule and sarcasm-aye, even
gross exaggeration-it is the one now before us.
Id. at 304-05, 86 N.W. at 325.
168. 431 F. Supp. at 1331.
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facts. Even if Proxmire's charges could fairly be said to have raised defama-
tory inferences about Hutchinson's misapplication of the funds, that would
not undercut Proxmire's fair comment defense. Because Proxmire attacked
only Hutchinson's research, the charges were not personal attacks. 69
Hutchinson should go remediless for those inferences that "rubbed off" on
him from Proxmire's true statements.
Statements Protected by Fair Comment Must Relate to a
Matter of Public Interest
The fourth requirement of the fair comment defense is that the opinion
must be on a subject of public interest or concern. 7" Both official acts and
personal characteristics of public officials, 7' as well as creative works pre-
sented to the public,' are unquestionably of public interest."'3 Public offi-
cial cases, however, have not been decided under fair comment since the
Supreme Court applied the "actual malice" standard to discussions of public
officials in New York Times."'
Yet, the Supreme Court's interventions into libel law over the past two
decades raise a question and a possible problem regarding comments on
matters of public interest. In 1971, the Court held in Rosenbloom v. Met-
romedia, Inc." that a subject of public interest would trigger the plaintiff's
burden of proving "actual malice." Three years later that burden was nulli-
fied in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' primarily on the rationale that judges
should not decide what subjects are of public interest. The serious question
raised by this reversal is whether critics and commentators can seek any
protection from liability for statements about a subject matter of public in-
terest when the plaintiff is a private individual. The potential problem ab-
sent such protection is the possibility that fundamental first amendment
rights will be eroded despite "our profound national commitment to the
169. 579 F.2d at 1037 app. A.
170. See generally Shenkman v. O'Malley, 2 A.D.2d 567, 157 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1956); Streeter
v. Emmons County Farmers' Press, 438 N.D. 57, 222 N.W. 455 (1928).
171. See Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 539-42 (6th Cir. 1893); Coleman v. MacLen-
nan, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P. 281, 285 (1908); Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 263 A.D. 403,
412, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840, 849 (1942), affd, 296 N.Y. 716, 70 N.E.2d 537 (1946); Cohalan v. New
York Tribune, Inc., 172 Misc. 20, 21, 15 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
172. See Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court stated: "When an
author submits his work to the public he must, of necessity, expect criticism of that work. He is
said, in fact, to invite criticism, and no matter how hostile such criticism may be, the critic
enjoys a privilege to make such critical comments." Id. at 1052. See also Fisher v. Washington
Post Co., 212 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Guitar
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
173. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
174. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
175. 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971).
176. 418 U.S. 3?3, 345-46 (1974).
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principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." "
In addition, the Court's reversal denies history. If courts cannot deter-
mine what subjects are of public interest, then fair comment (not to mention
other legal doctrines) would lack a legal and rational basis. Traditionally,
however, courts have had little difficulty determining matters of public in-
terest. Further, the legal community has not fallen into step with the Su-
preme Court's Gertz reversal; scholars'78 and lower courts"79 have conclu-
sively demonstrated that the Supreme Court's "actual malice" decisions are
grounded in the concept of public interest, the Court's protests notwith-
standing. "'
So strong has been the opposition to the Court's elimination of public
interest subjects from the orbit of privileged statements, that some state
courts have nevertheless imposed an "actual malice" burden in such cases.
For instance, Indiana adopted the Rosenbloom rule even though it recog-
nized that the Supreme Court had rejected it, extending the "actual malice"
burden to all discussion of public interest even though the plaintiff
is a private person.' Some courts, it thus seems, are still able and will-
177. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
178. Commentators have argued that public interest is at the heart of the Supreme Court's
reasoning, even in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 428 U.S. 448 (1976), where the Court ostensibly repudiated the rule that the existence of
public interest invokes the "actual malice" burden. See generally Eaton, supra note 5. Eaton
argued that whether Elmer Gertz was to be "classified as a public figure for a limited issue"
must begin with a determination of whether the controversy in which the plaihtiff participated
was a public issue. Id. at 1424. Eaton noted that making this determination is precisely the
mischief for which the Gertz Court criticized Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971). Id. at 1424. According to Gertz, such mischief arises from "forcing federal judges to
decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and
which do not-to determine . . . 'what information is relevant to self-government.' We doubt
the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges." 418 U.S. at 346 (1974). Eaton
concluded that "while 'public controversy' may be a significant step removed from 'matter of
public interest,' the task of determining which publications address public issues and which do
not has nevertheless been recommitted to the conscience of judges." Eaton, supra note 5, at
1424. See also Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel: A Concept in Search of a
Definition, 33 Bus. LAW. 109 (1978); Prager, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public In-
terest, 30 STAN. L. REV. 157 (1977); Wheeler, Media Liability for Libel of Newsworthy Persons
Before and After Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 5 FLA. ST. L. REV. 446 (1977).
179. See, e.g., AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Pub., Inc., 162 Ind.
App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974); Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 341 A.2d 856
(1975).
180. For example, in a recent defamation case, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S.
157 (1980), the Supreme Court ignored the public interest rationale, basing its decision that the
"actual malice" standard did not apply on its finding that the plaintiff was not a public figure.
The Court specifically stated that a "libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness
to justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times." Id. at 168-69.
181. AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Pub., Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671,
321 N.E.2d 580 (1974). The AAFCO court stated:
The key analytic determinant in the application of constitutional protections for
speech and press in libel actions by "private" individuals must be whether the
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ing to decide whether an issue is a matter of public interest and con-
cern. t82
Some uncertainty, however, remains in divining how these courts decide
whether a matter is of public interest. The method used bears striking simi-
larity to the test for "limited purpose" public figures. I Traditionally, plain-
tiffs against whom fair comment is asserted can be said to have invited criti-
cism of their public works and acts"' in the same way that limited purpose
public figures have opened themselves to certain false statements of fact
related to the events or issues that caused them to be deemed public
figures." In short, both groups "assume the risk" 1 of a sharper than nor-
mal challenge, a challenge consisting of a vituperative opinion in fair com-
ment cases or a false statement of fact made without "actual malice" in lim-
ited purpose public figure cases."'
communication involved concerns an issue of general or public interest without re-
gard to whether the individual is famous or anonymous.
Every citizen, as a necessary part of living in society, must assume the risk of media
comment when he becomes involved, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in a
matter of general or public interest.
The contention that the judiciary will prove [itself] inadequate [to determine what
subjects are of public interest] would be more persuasive were it not for the sizable
body of federal and state cases that have employed the concept of a matter of
general or public interest to reach decisions in libel cases involving private citizens.
Id. at 680-86, 321 N.E.2d at 587-90.
182. Lower courts have found the existence of public interest for fair comment purposes even
where the subject matter was neither a creative work nor a public official's conduct. See Cepeda
v. Cowles Magazine & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1964) (performance of major
league baseball player); Golden N. Airways v. Tanana Pub. Co., 218 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1955)
(operation of airline); Brewer v. Hearst Pub. Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1950) (vivisection of
animals); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975) (suitability of high school
principal for his job); Shenkman v. O'Malley, 2 A.D.2d 567, 157 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1956) (doctor's
treatment of major league baseball player); Cowan v. Time, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 198, 245
N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (boating safety); Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 12 Wash. App.
215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974) (fluoridation of water).
183. See note 28 supra.
184. See Porcella v. Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962) (art authentication); Potts v.
Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (published work is of public interest); Guitar v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (artistic works); Cherry v. Des Moines
Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901) (public interest and attendant assumption of risk
found in plaintiff's "artistic" works); Shenkman v. O'Malley, 2 A.D.2d 567, 157 N.Y.S.2d 290
(1956) (professional athlete's injury); Cohalan v. New York Tribune, Inc., 172 Misc. 20, 15
N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (public officials were said to have assumed the risk of adverse
comment).
185. See, e.g., Gertz v, Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court stated: "More
commonly, those classified as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they
invite attention and comment." Id. at 345.
186. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 610(3), Comments e & f (1938).
187. The similarity gains further importance because the public interest aspect of fair com-
ment will become more significant as the Supreme Court continues to constrict the public
figure category. Fair comment may invoke its own "actual malice" standard even where "actual
malice" is no longer available on a public figure or public interest basis.
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The fair comment defense may prove to be more expansive than the pub-
lic figure-"actual malice" protection, especially considering that the realm of
public figures is being whittled away by the Supreme Court." Commenta-
tors and courts generally recognize that encouraging discussion of matters of
public interest is the rationale for free speech protections.' In fact, the
state court rendering the decision that provided the model for the New York
Times "actual malice" standard saw the need to protect free speech, broadly
applying that standard to all allegedly defamatory statements about subjects
of public interest."
Logic therefore demands that the Supreme Court reconsider its post-New
York Times decisions and apply the "actual malice" standard to all defama-
tion actions concerning matters of public interest. To do so would breathe
new life into the common law fair comment doctrine. A reversal of all recent
defamation decisions would not be necessary for the renewed effectiveness
of fair comment; the Supreme Court need only affirm the undeniably pre-
ponderant view of the lower courts and the legal profession that discussion
of matters of public interest should not be stifled.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire provides an example of how fair comment could
be applied more expansively than the public figure standard. The Supreme
Court held that the mere receipt of public funding did not transform Dr.
Hutchinson into a public figure; '9' yet, the disbursement of public funds is
certainly a matter of widespread public interest. By receiving public fund-
ing, Hutchinson "assumed the risk" that those with an interest in the use of
the funds would issue vituperative opinions regarding the manner in which
the funds were spent. The Restatement of Torts supported this conclusion
by stating that fair comment makes criticism of independent contractors
working for the government privileged.' Hutchinson v. Proxmire, there-
fore, illustrates that speech left unprotected because the plaintiff is not a
public figure may nevertheless be protected under fair comment when the
subject matter is of public interest.
188. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 178 & 179 and accompanying text supra.
190. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). The court stated:
[Tihe correct rule, whatever it is, must govern in cases other than those involving
candidates for office. It must apply to all officers and agents of government-
municipal, state and national; to the management of all public institutions-
educational, charitable and penal; to the conduct of all corporate enterprises
affected with a public interest -transportation, banking, insurance, and to innumer-
able other subjects involving the public welfare.
id. at 734-35, 98 P. 289 (emphasis added).
191. 443 U.S. at 133-36.
192. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 607(2), Comment g (1938). The Comment states: "The fact
that the institution is maintained by public funds . . . is sufficient to bring it within the priv-
ilege." Id.
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Opinion Must Be Expressed Without Malice
All authorities agree that the defense of fair comment is defeasible upon a
finding of malice.13 The meaning of the word "malice" has, however,
changed dramatically. The development of a constitutional "actual malice"
standard, the most important recent change in American libel law, has
affected fair comment as well."' The Supreme Court decisions" rendering
false statements of fact non-actionable unless those statements are published
with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of their truth or falsity
mean that certain privileged, false statements of fact may now be the basis
for opinions protected by fair comment.'6
The pre-New York Times fair comment cases were divided on what type of
malice standard should be applied. The majority view focused on the atti-
tude of the defendant toward the plaintiff and commonly defined malice as
"personal spite or ill will." 1 The focus in the minority of fair comment
jurisdictions was on the defendant's thoughts about the factual statements-
published.' The minority made false statements of fact about public affairs
privileged when those statements were made in good faith and with the
belief that the statements were true;' 5 this view was the model for the
United States Supreme Court when it first adopted the "actual malice"
standard in New York Times.
At present, the "actual malice" standard applies to the facts underlying
the opinion, at least when the plaintiff is a public official 00 or a public
figure."°  The same standard was at one time prescribed for all discussions
193. See Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); Cherry v. Des Moines Leader,
114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908);
Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 83 N.W. 110 (1900).
194. See notes 21-34 and accompanying text supra.
195. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis
Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
196. See Naughton & Gilbertson, "Libelous Ridicule by Journalists," 18 CLEVE.-MAR. L.
REV. 450 (1969) (the "actual malice" standard will eventually make privileged facts underlying
opinions in all fair comment situations).
197. See, e.g., Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 300, 86 N.W. 323, 323 (1901).
198. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
199. See id. The Coleman court, in adopting the minority rule, succinctly stated the differ-
ence between the minority and majority rules:
[According to ] the greater number of [jurisdictions], the occasion giving rise to
conditional [fair comment] privilege does not justify statements which are untrue in
fact, although made in good faith, without malice and under the honest belief that
they are true. A minority allows the privilege under such circumstances.
Id. at 726, 98 P. at 286.
200. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
201. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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of matters of public interest,' but that privilege was withdrawn in Gertz. 3
State and lower federal courts have, however, extended the "actual malice"
standard or its equivalent to false statements of fact about private people
involved in matters of public interest, both before "actual malice" was a
factor in the Supreme Court's view of public interest cases 04 and after
"actual malice" was eliminated from the court's consideration of public in-
terest matters.205 The current federal position is that the "actual malice"
standard is required to privilege false statements of fact about a public offi-
cial or public figure, but not when plaintiff is a private person, even if the
matter is one of public interest.
The current position of the federal courts provides the minimum level of
constitutional protection, although Gertz left the states free to "define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehoods injurious to the private individual." ' Exten-
sive authority in state and federal systems indicates that the "actual malice"
standard should apply to discussions of matters of public interest,- and the
Supreme Court has ruled out the traditional "spite," or "ill will" form of
malice in fair comment cases involving public figure2 0 and public official
plaintiffs. 10 Toward that end, jury instructions couching malice in terms of
"spite, hostility or deliberate intention to harm" or stating that malice could
be inferred from the published words alone, have been rejected by the
Court as "constitutionally insufficient where discussion of public affairs is
concerned." 2"' Even before the out-of-court settlement of Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, extension of "actual malice" protection by the state courts 12 to the
factual statements in fair comment situations seemed likely, when those
statements involved matters of public interest.
As an independent element of fair comment, malice has received little
attention in the cases, probably because of its slippery and subjective na-
ture. When a court can decide whether an underlying fact is true, whether
the subject is of public interest, or whether an opinion has a basis in truly
202. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
203. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
204. See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Pearson v.
Fairbanks Pub. Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1966).
205. See, e.g., Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979) (interpreting Alaska state
law); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Pub., Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321
N.E.2d 580 (1974); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1976).
206. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
207. Id. at 347.
208. See notes 204 & 205 supra.
209. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966).
210. Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970).
211. Id. (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966)).
212. See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church, 103 Ariz. 582, 597, 447 P.2d 840, 855
(1968).
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stated facts-decisions easier than divining the defendant's state of mind-
judicial minds will continue to focus on these more tangible issues. What-
ever importance is assigned to malice, an impressive case can be made from
Supreme Court decisions that "actual malice" must be applied in all cases
involving discussions of public interest, including fair comment cases.213
Hutchinson v. Proxmire as a Fair Comment Case
Fair comment thus protects statements of opinion based upon truly stated
facts. Fair comment-protected opinions must involve matters of public in-
terest or concern and must not be overly personal attacks on the plaintiff.
The defense can, however, be liberally applied, and wide latitude can be
used in several areas, including determination of what constitutes the factual
basis of the opinion, whether the subject is of public interest, and whether
the defendant's attack on the plaintiff was too personal. Although common
law malice will probably no longer defeat the defense, "actual malice" will.
The defense of fair comment has therefore changed since New York Times,
but has been broadened to the extent that "actual malice" replaces its com-
mon law variety. The re-popularization of the fair comment defense will be
aided if the concept of "opinion" is expanded by the judiciary, and a corre-
sponding contraction occurs in the concept of "facts."
If fair comment had been properly considered in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
Dr. Hutchinson's complaint would have been dismissed. The only state-
ments made by Senator Proxmire about Dr. Hutchinson that might have
been false were that his research was "perhaps duplicative" and that Hutch-
inson "made a fortune" from his government funding. Fair comment would
have been an effective defense in the case because most courts would agree
that Dr. Hutchinson's funding was of public interest, that he was not per-
sonally attacked, that the characterization of his work was not so misleading
as to be false, and that there was no showing of "actual malice." The phrase
"made a fortune" probably cannot be shown to be true or false because
everyone's idea of a fortune is different.2" Unless that phrase can be said to
clearly imply a misappropriation of funds, the statement is protected opin-
ion. Regarding the charge that Hutchinson's research was "perhaps duplica-
213. Although recent cases are contradictory in some aspects of the issue, the better view
supports application of "actual malice." Influenced by federal labor law, the Supreme Court
applied "actual malice" to a case involving no public officials or public figures. Old Dominion v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the
"actual malice" standard to a private false light libel plaintiff involved in a matter of public
interest. Id. But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (decided on the same
day as Old Dominion and apparently rejecting application of "actual malice" to matters of public
interest).
214. After the out of court settlement, Proxmire stated he wished to "clarify" some of his
statements on the research. Although the amount of federal expenditure was large, he said that
Dr. Hutchinson did not make a personal fortune. 126 CONG. REC. S2831 (1980).
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tive," the doctor's similar experiments on a variety of animals show that
Proxmire's statement is common sense to the average citizen even if it
seems gross and unfair to research scientists." 5 Proxmire's statements
mocked and ridiculed Dr. Hutchinson's research, not the man or his mo-
tives.
The right to criticize expenditures of public money should belong to every
citizen, particularly to an elected representative who states a presumably
good faith criticism. Fair comment should also protect statements like Prox-
mire's no matter who made them because the defense is available without
regard to the status of the defendant or plaintiff.216
Hutchinson v. Proxmire helps illuminate the reason for fair comment's
neglect. Protecting remarks like Proxmire's with fair comment may seem
circuitous but only because of the perceptions created in the minds of
lawyers and judges by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny. 217
When "actual malice" was used effectively by defendants against public fig-
ures or in matters of public interest, the more difficult fair comment defense
naturally took a back seat. After the decisions in Gertz, Firestone and
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, it is hoped that fair comment will attain renewed
vigor.
OTHER HIDDEN FAIR COMMENT CASES
Not only in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, but in a wide range of other fact
situations, fair comment could have been employed but was not. The re-
mainder of this Article focuses on ten cases tried under a New York Times-
"truth or falsity" framework but better suited for fair comment-"opinion"
treatment. Special emphasis is placed upon public interest and public figure
cases because all of the former and some of the latter have been undercut by
recent Supreme Court decisions." 8 The following evaluation reveals that
mistaken analysis has usually arisen when the courts failed to evaluate the
nature of the allegedly defamatory statement. Courts have too eagerly in-
voked the public figure or official doctrines because those concepts neatly
dispose of disputes. Judicial analysis should not, however, hinge on expe-
215. Since this case arose, the Fund to Protect Scholars from Defamation has been formed
and is making a national appeal for funds to help pay legal costs of Hutchinson's Supreme Court
battle. This fund was established following recognition by other research scientists that such
suits substantially curtail the awarding of research grants for further studies. SCIENCE, July 13,
1979, at 170-71.
216. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974) (status of party not deter-
minative of "public figure" classification; rather, party's participation in the particular con-
troversy giving rise to the defamation is crucial).
217. See notes 21-34 and accompanying text supra.
218. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1.974). See discussions of these cases in notes 25 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
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diency; rather, the actual meaning of the allegedly defamatory words must
be evaluated.2 19
All principal cases discussed below arose after 1967 when the Supreme
Court first applied "actual malice" to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts.' In each, the courts applied "actual malice" with its truth-or-
falsity analysis, usually because the plaintiff was held to be a public figure.
Yet, fair comment could have formed the primary rationale for deciding each
case. No reasons appear for the failure to consider fair comment other than a
preoccupation with New York Times and its progeny and a misplaced con-
cern for expediency.
Tait v. King Broadcasting Co." 1 illustrates an approach typically taken by
post-New York Times courts. The defendant was the host of a radio talk
show. When asked one night whether the plaintiff had ever been a guest on
the show, the defendant answered, "Yes, . . . Our leading American local
fascist and Jew-baiter-I've had him on." '  The plaintiff was active in
right-wing causes, and the trial brought out the defendant's knowledge of
plaintiff's political activities.' The Washington Court of Appeals reasoned
that "[t]he first inquiry for the court is whether Tait [the plaintiff] may prop-
erly be classed as a 'public figure,' "2' and swiftly found that plaintiff was a
public figure. The remainder of the decision was devoted to the issue of
whether defendant had any knowledge of the falsity of his statement, or any
reckless disregard about the truth, that is, whether the defendant acted with
"actual malice."
Like many courts since New York Times, the Tait court never asked the
proper threshold question: Was the alleged defamation a statement of fact or
opinion? Following the rule discussed earlier,an the statement should have
been characterized as an opinion, because the meaning of the word "fascist"
is debatable and incapable of proof of truth or falsity. "Jew-baiter" is a state-
ment of opinion under the same reasoning." 6 The defendant's opinions
should have been defended as opinion; discussing this kind of political label-
ing in terms of truth and falsity is absurd. The problem was not that the
wrong result was reached. In this and most cases, the result would have
been the same under public figure or fair comment analysis, with the de-
fendant's getting the lion's share of verdicts. The case illustrates the utility of
219. See Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel: A Concept in Search of a Defini-
tion, 33 Bus. LAw. 709, 717 (1978).
220. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
221. 1 Wash. App. 250, 460 P.2d 307 (1969).
222. Id. at 251, 460 P.2d at 309.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 253, 460 P.2d 310.
225. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra.
226. The phrase "Jew-baiter," however, could be found to be a statement of fact in light of a
cartoon in plaintiff's newspaper showing "a superior court judge of Jewish faith [which] carried a
derisive caption .. . reflecting on his religious background as well as his performance as supe-
rior court judge." 1 Wash. App. at 253, 460 P.2d at 310.
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fair comment to protect open debate as the Supreme Court continues to
savage the public figure doctrine.
Sports has proved to be a subject fertile with litigation that ignores fair
comment. In Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co.,27 the plaintiff was a college
basketball coach. An allegedly libelous article appeared in the Saturday
Evening Post,an under the by-line of a college basketball referee who had
quit that position because of crowd violence.'n The referee had charged the
plaintiff with poor sportsmanship, incendiary behavior at basketball games,
and inciting violence by disputing the referee's decisions. According to the
referee: "Grayson [the plaintiff] leaped up, kicked some towels and yelled,
If that isn't the worst--call I ever saw in my life!'. . . Grayson raved and
complained to the crowd. It was like ordering a tree and a rope."-
The trial court's verdict for the plaintiff was reversed and the case was
remanded for a new trial after the Washington Supreme Court found a dis-
puted question of fact to be decided by the jury.23 That decision was unfor-
tunate because whether the coach's actions contributed to the violent atmos-
phere cannot be absolutely proved true or false. The parties did not
dispute that the referee had been physically attacked by "fans" at the game
in question. Although parts of his charges could not be proved with absolute
certainty, surely the referee should be free to criticize those who appeared
to set the stage for the assault. The elements of a fair comment defense were
all present in this case: college sports, the subject of the magazine article, is
certainly of public interest and only the public actions of the coach were
criticized, so that no personal attack could be found. Fair comment should
have been applied as long as the coach in fact "raved and complained to the
crowd," because the cause-and-effect relationship of the coach's complaints
to the assault is a matter of opinion that cannot be proved true or false.
The court, however, remanded the case, so as to find those ephemeral
"facts." Fifty rioting fans were available as witnesses; perhaps the court in-
tended that the one who threw the bottle which split the referee's scalp
should have been asked if he threw it because of the coach's antics. Applica-
227. 72 Wash. 2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967).
228. This article appeared in the January 5-12, 1963 edition of the Saturday Evening Post
and reported a referee's description and criticism of "Basketball's Bullies, reckless coaches,
rowdy players and riotous fans [who] disgrace our colleges .... Grayson, the head basketball
coach at the University of Washington at the time of the publication, was prominently named in
the article as an example of "explosive bench behavior"-a coach's reaction to adverse decisions
by a referee-which contributes to a countrywide "scandal" of "rabble-rousing" and violence.
229. The referee, Al Lightner, related his story to Al Stump, a free lance writer, concerning
Grayson's inappropriate and incendiary behavior at a University of Washington v. U.C.L.A.
basketball game. The results of Grayson's behavior according to Lightner were student riots and
personal injury to Lightner causing him to refuse to officiate any further games involving
Grayson or his team. 72 Wash. 2d at 1000, 1002, 436 P.2d at 757, 759.
230. Id. at 1005, 436 P.2d at 761.
231. Id. at 1008, 436 P.2d at 762.
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tion of fair comment at the outset could have eliminated such a hopeless
inquiry.
Another ridiculous sports lawsuit, Time, Inc. v. Johnston,232 might have
been avoided or simplified if the fair comment defense was understood by
courts and pleaded. Eventually judgment was rendered for the defendant,
but not until the case reached the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Sports Illustrated, in an article naming professional basketball player Bill
Russell as its "Sportsman of the Year," quoted a former coach of Russell who
said that Russell's defensive work in one game had "destroyed" and "psycho-
logically destroyed" the plaintiff, an opposing player.m The court correctly
noted that this meant "merely that Russell had completely outplayed and
overshadowed the plaintiff, not that Russell had literally 'destroyed' him." ' 3
Even though all of the fair comment elements were present, 3 the court
cited no fair comment cases and reached its decision for the defendant be-
cause the plaintiff was a public figure who had failed to prove "actual
malice."- z  The case again emphasizes the preoccupation of attorneys and
judges with the New York Times Sirens, while ignoring the more appropri-
ate analytical framework of fair comment.
Fair comment was also overlooked at trial and on appeal in Bon Air Hotel,
Inc. v. Time, Inc."' For years, the plaintiff-hotel had served the crowds in
Augusta, Georgia at the Masters' Golf Tournament. Sports Illustrated car-
ried a story which, in the district court's words, described the hotel's
"alleged decline from the status of grande dame into the station of a dowdy,
decrepit and disheveled old woman." The basis for the appellate court's
decision was the "actual malice" rule, raised because the Masters' Tourna-
ment was of public interest."9  The court found that none of the allegedly
libelous statements were published with knowledge of falsity or reckless dis-
regard of the truth, and rendered summary judgment for defendants."0
232. 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971).
233. Id. at 379.
234. Id. at 385.
235. It is clear that four of the elements of the fair comment defense were fulfilled in this
case. Certainly, the statement of Sports Illustrated, quoting the coach, that the plaintiff was
"psychologically destroyed" was an opinion-it could not be proved true or false. The state-
ment. just as clearly, was not made maliciously, nor was it overly personal, relating, as it did, to
the plaintiff's play in a basketball game. The statement related to a matter of public interest-a
professional basketball game. Arguably, the truly stated facts requirement was also met-what
happened in that basketball game was, no doubt, reported in the newspapers. That the under-
lying facts be available is sufficient, according to the better reasoned cases, to satisfy the truly
stated facts element. See notes 128-130 and accompanying text supra.
236. 448 F.2d at 383-84.
237. 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
238. Id. at 860 (quoting Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D. Ga.
1969)).
239. Id. at 862.
240. Id. at 863-67.
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The story, however, only contained statements written with a story teller's
"piquant pen;" 24 statements not containing false allegations, but dripping
with protected "exaggeration, slight irony or wit."242 Such statements as the
hotel has a "whitewashed face," is staffed with ancient waiters in white coats
who "tumble drowsily through the dining room," or that the hotel manage-
ment's attitude toward its guests is that of "stay-at-your-own-risk" cannot
reasonably be interpreted as other than opinion. ' But the court spoke of
facts, not opinions, and stated that "Bon Air presented no evidence that
Time or Jenkins [the writer] published the statements with knowledge of
their falsity or with 'serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.' " 1
If wasted time and expense were confined to the essentially frivolous
amphitheatres of sports, concern with improperly tried cases would not be
so serious. More vital discussion is unfortunately also affected, as in Cera v.
Mulligan." In that case, plaintiffs were chiropractors who appeared on a
local television show to rebut an earlier televised criticism of chiropractic.
Defendant Mulligan was chairman of the community relations committee of
New York's Monroe County Medical Society. After the appearance of the
plaintiff chiropractors, he wrote a letter to a newspaper that mentioned
various studies that were highly critical of chiropractic. The essence of the
claimed libel was the defendant's calling chiropractic a "dangerous cult," and
his statement that the television program that presented the chiropractors'
rebuttal, was a "promotion of quackery." The court decided that the plain-
tiffs had made themselves public figures for the limited purpose" of criti-
cism of chiropractic. 7 The court gave judgment for defendants because
241. See Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. v. Citizen-Sentinel Pubs., Inc., 260 N.Y. 106, 119, 183
N.E. 193, 198 (1932).
242. Id. at 118, 183 N.E. at 198.
243. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 866 (5th Cir. 1970). The complaint
alleged that the article as a whole was defamatory and that ten specific statements in the article
were false and libeled Bon Air: (1) the hotel had a "whitewashed face"; (2) the hotel is staffed
with ancient waiters in white coats who "tumble drowsily through the dining room"; (3) the
hotel management's attitude toward its guests is that of "stay-at-your-own risk"; (4) the hotel is
gradually being converted into a "residence for the elderly"; (5) halls "sloped awkwardly" to-
wards the rooms; (6) rooms are "wide enough so that by turning sideways a guest can walk
between the bed and dresser"; (7) "Windows are of two types. If upon entry, a window is up it
is not likely ever to come down, especially if the evening is brisk. On the other hand, if the
window is down it will never go up"; (8) tubs and basins were never "worth much"; (9) Sleeping
accomodations are described: "Sleeping at the Bon Air has long been difficult for reasons other
than the heat or the cold or the hardness of the beds. It is noisy. Not the least amount of noise
sometimes is caused by the clacking of highheeled shoes going down the fire escape outside a
guest's window at 4 AM"; and (10) the hotel has a "sell out crowd" for the week of April 6
through April 12, 1964." Id.
244. Id. A cartoon of the hotel was also the subject of an "actual malice" discussion by the
court. Id. at 866-67.
245. 79 Misc. 2d 400, 358 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
246. See note 28 supra.
247. 79 Misc. 2d at 406, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
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"there was no 'actual malice' demonstrated." ' In the very next sentence,
however, the court demonstrated the applicability of fair comment to the
case: "The letter did no more than espouse the opinion that chiropractors
are a 'dangerous cult.' "1,"
In Sellers v. Time,, ° on the other hand, fair comment was mentioned, but
decision did not rest on that ground. The case began with a freak golf acci-
dent in which the plaintiff partially blinded his golfing partner. The injured
golfer sued Sellers and Time magazine reported that action. Subsequently,
the plaintiff sued Time for libel. According to the court, the substance of any
libel occurred when Time called the plaintiff a "duffer" and reported that
when Sellers swung his club, he had "his mind on a potential deal."2
Although the facts of the case and some of the court's analysis fit fair com-
ment, the court did not clearly state what defense it relied on when it
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court spoke of
fair reports of judicial proceedings and of a public interest bringing the case
within the "actual malice" rule. 2 The court concluded that the term "duf-
fer" was "a fair comment" and stated that Time's ignorance of what was on
Seller's mind when he swung the club did not make the article defamatory:
"Such a statement is merely an expression of the opinion of him who makes
it. Its truth or falsity is probably not even susceptible of proof." M This is
plainly fair comment talk. The court might thus have dispensed with "actual
malice" and fair reports of judicial proceedings because the article contained
no false statements, and all the other fair comment criteria were satisfied.
Sellers therefore appears to be a fair comment case, but the dispository
grounds remain uncertain.
Use of fair comment would have resulted in judgment for the defendants
in Sellers and in Cera just as did the confused reasoning in the former and
the public figure finding in the latter, so one cannot flatly conclude that
these cases were wrongly decided or defended. But with the Supreme
Court's recent vacillation on the scope of the public figure category, fair
comment rests on firmer ground. Fair comment could have been raised suc-
cessfully as an alternative defense.' No matter how many defenses are
248. Id. at 45, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
249. Id.
250. 299 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
251. Id. at 584.
252. Id. at 586.
253. Id.
254. Fair comment was used successfully as an alternative defense in Exner v. American
Medical Ass'n, 12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974). In Exner, the defendant's medical
journal ran a pro-fluoridation article about opponents of fluoridation, stating that these oppo-
nents "range from the sincere to the charlatan, from the confused to the quack," and called the
plaintiff "[p]erhaps the most frequently quoted 'professional' opponent." Id. at 217, 529 P.2d at
866. The article was not defamatory and the court recognized a fair comment defense as disposi-
tory because the article "commented fairly on the plaintiff's position on fluoridation and [did not
attack] his personal character or medical competence." Id. at 220, 529 P.2d at 867. So powerful
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chosen, the one designed to protect opinions should be used both by the
litigants and by the court when the allegedly defamatory statement is an
opinion.
Strong opinion was again treated as fact in Edwards v. Audubon Society,
Inc.,2 where the court styled its decision in public figure-"actual malice"
terms. In Edwards, the Society published the book, American Birds, which
contained a foreword about the relationship between birds, pesticides, and
bird watchers. Scientists and other observers had disputed the effects of the
pesticide DDT on American bird populations. The foreword to American
Birds stated that although the number of birds spotted had increased, this
increase was not evidence of a healthy bird population unaffected by insecti-
cide, but only evidence of more and better bird watchers."'6 Some ob-
servers had interpreted the increased bird counts as a healthy sign, 2 7 but the
book claimed that was not true: "Any time you hear a 'scientist' say the
opposite, you are in the presence of someone who is being paid to lie, or is
parroting something he knows little about.""' John Devlin, a nature re-
porter for the New York Times, read the foreword to American Birds, did
some investigating, and wrote a story with the headline, "Pesticide Spokes-
men Accused of 'Lying' on Higher Bird Count." The article quoted the fore-
word and the charges of "lying" in the context of the disputed statistical
interpretations. The article essentially reported the charge that pesticide
company spokesmen who disagreed with the Audubon Society interpreta-
tions were "paid to lie."- The court of appeals accepted the district court's
finding that the plaintiffs were public figures for purposes of the DDT con-
troversy and the case was decided on that ground. °
Once again, a case contained an unrecognized fair comment situation; the
court itself analyzed the so-called libel as an opinion, the basis for which was
set forth. In the court's words, "[t]he epithet 'liar' in this context, standing
by itself, merely expressed the opinion that anyone who persisted in misus-
ing Audubon statistics after being forewarned could not be intellectually
honest. Since the basis for this opinion was fully set forth, the communica-
tion . . . cannot be libelous, however mistaken [it] might be.""26 Even
is the sway of public figure-"actual malice" doctrine, however, that even after the court con-
cluded that the article was non-defamatory on the basis of fair comment, it spent the largest
section of its opinion deciding that the plaintiff was a public figure, and hence discussing "actual
malice." But the article contained no untrue statement to which the "actual malice" standard
could apply.
255. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977).
256. Id. at 116.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 117.
259. Id. The defendant's charge was in the alternative, inferring that the "scientists" may not
have been paid to lie, but may instead have only been woefully ill-informed.
260. Id. at 120-22.
261. Id. at 121 (emphasis in original).
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though the court felt that a "paid liar" was worse than one who performed
gratis,' it nevertheless reversed for the defendants.2
Although the court concluded differently, it seems the word "paid" adds
little to the word "liar" in the context of this dispute. The defendant's state-
ment was just a harder-hitting version of: "Plaintiffs are paid by chemical
companies; their interpretations of statistics do not account for certain crucial
elements; we disagree with their interpretations, which are probably inten-
tionally misleading." Although the defendants prevailed upon appeal, the
time may come when plaintiffs like these will not be deemed public
figures,'" "actual malice" will not be applied, and plaintiffs will recover. Be-
cause the basis for the accusation "paid to lie" was clearly set forth, fair
comment should have been applied to the case.
Other hidden fair comment cases illustrate further advantages of the fair
comment defense. The Supreme Court's comments on the "voluntariness"
aspect of public figures could cause the law of defamation to become mired
in a swamp of the Court's own making. One reason Mary Alice Firestone
was not a public figure in Time, Inc. v. Firestone was that, regardless of the
fact that she held press conferences, her divorce action was "no more volun-
tary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his
interest in court."2 The Court's logic suggests potentially unwieldy cir-
cumstances in other defamation cases because the dividing line between
voluntary and involuntary actions remains indistinct. Following the Court's
logic, several circumstances pose difficulties: Does a professional athlete
"voluntarily" submit himself to scrutiny so as to become a public figure?
Probably not: the rewards of professional athletics so outweigh any other
work that the athlete seems to have little choice. Similarly, a basketball
coach can never work in private. And in Fram v. Yellow Cab Co.' a man
trying to run a taxi company in the face of stiff competition and heavy reg-
ulation probably faced no real choice other than to speak publicly to protect
his business interests.
In Fram, the plaintiff operated a taxicab company in Pittsburgh. After he
appeared on a television news program, a spokesman for competing cab
companies appeared the next night on the same program, and described
Fram's earlier remarks as "a little bit like the sort of paranoid thinking that
you get from a schizophrenic." M7 The federal district court recognized that,
in context, these words were merely hyperbole, but the court did not say
that the words were opinion. Instead, Fram was found to be a public figure
because he had "thrust himself into the 'vortex' of a public controversy."-
262. Id. at 122.
263. Id. at 123.
264. See notes 24-33 and accompanying text supra.
265. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971)).
266. 380 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
267. Id. at 1329.
268. Id. at 1334.
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The reasoning in Firestone could lead a court to conclude that Fram was
overruled because Fram was forced to speak in public to defend his business
interests just as Mary Alice Firestone was forced to go to court to get a
divorce. If the public figure category is undermined by "voluntariness"
issues and uncertainty, fair comment will be available to defendants because
of its public interest component.
The public figure defense may also be limited when a once-prominent
person fades into obscurity. The Supreme Court has not determined when
such a person stops being a public figure," but the issue did arise in the
1974 Seventh Circuit case, Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, IncY0
Actor Lincoln Theodore Perry, popularly known as Stepin Fechit, ended his
movie career in 1938. He was still active in show business in 1968, however,
when a television program on black history showed clips of his old movies
and stated that Perry popularized the "tradition of the lazy, stupid, crap-
shooting, chicken-stealing idiot."' 7 After Perry sued CBS, the court held
him to be a public figure, and affirmed the lower court's judgment for the
defendant272 If Perry had not continued his theatrical work, the thirty-year
lapse between his last movie and the alleged defamation might have re-
turned him to private figure status.,"3 If so, fair comment might have been
the only defense available because the private status will not raise the
"actual malice" rule. No fact-opinion problem could have arisen because the
statements claimed to be defamatory were merely opinions about Perry's
role in movie history.
In one case, the fair comment doctrine actually surfaced. Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche 2 7' appears to acknowledge the vitality of fair comment. Jose
Luis Castillo-Puche, a Spanish writer, made statements about A. E. Hotch-
ner, a well-known American writer and authority on and acquaintance of
Ernest Hemingway. The jury found six passages in Castillo-Puche's book to
269. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). In Wolston, the Court
declined to decide the issue when 16 years had elapsed between the defamation and the
plaintiff's notoriety. The reader may decide whether this was truly not a consideration in the
Court's holding that the plaintiff was not a public figure. Justices Blackmun and Marshall,
however, would have held that the plaintiff was not a public figure because of the lapse of time
and accordingly would not have decided whether the plaintiff had been a public figure at an
earlier time. Id. at 169-72 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
270. 499,F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1974).
271. Id. at 799.
272. Id. at 802.
273. Id. at 801. With reference to the limited public figure concept, the court held:
[Ilt is not necessary in this appeal to deal with the question whether a lapse of time
will restore a public figure to the status of a private citizen. Perry continued to be a
public figure at the time of the broadcast. He may not have had the breadth of
national fame with which he was earlier associated, but he was still active in show
business and was being considered for the star role in a television series as well as
for the subject of a movie about his life.
Id.
274. 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977).
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libel Hotchner, including: a description of Hotchner as a manipulator, a
"toady," a hypocrite who exhibited "two-faced behavior" toward Heming-
way's true friends, and an "exploiter of [Hemingway's] reputation" who was
"never open and above-board."2 75 The final libel was a quote from Heming-
way, who allegedly said, "I don't really trust him," referring to Hotchner.2 76
At trial, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
plaintiff Hotchner was a public figure, and that the defendant had no knowl-
edge of the statement's falsity and did not publish with reckless disregard of
the truth. The court denied the motion, ruling that there was an issue of fact
on the "actual malice" question.2  The jury awarded the plaintiff $125,000
damages, and the Second Circuit reversed, '78 holding that the first five state-
ments were opinion, could not be proved true or false, and that "an asser-
tion that cannot be proved false cannot be held libellous." 279 The appellate
court therefore made a cursory fair comment analysis of the first five libels,
and interspersed that analysis with a public figure-"actual malice" evalua-
tion. Turning to the sixth libel, the circuit court found the quotation from
Hemingway to have been published without "actual malice." Nevertheless,
the court said of that same passage, "[w]here a passage is incapable of inde-
pendent verification, and where there are no convincing indicia of unreliabil-
ity, publication of the passage cannot constitute reckless disregard for
truth.""" The judiciary had finally arrived at the appropriate fair comment
conclusion after at least two years of litigation. Use of fair comment in the
first instance would likely have resulted in judgment for the defendant on a
motion for summary judgment. Not only is the fair comment analysis of the
above-discussed cases more intellectually satisfying, but practically, the dis-
position of cases can be simpler and more certain.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's libel decisions of the past six years are disturbing to
one who thinks that discussions of matters of public interest such as com-
munist plots, highly public divorce actions, and public expenditures should
be protected by a strong rule. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., promised to
"honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embod-
ied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all
discussion and communication involving matters of public interest or general
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous." 2l Gertz, Firestone, and Hutchinson v. Proxmire have reneged
275. 551 F.2d at 912.
276. Id.
277. 404 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
278. 551 F.2d at 914.
279. Id. at 913.
280. Id. at 914.
281. 403 U.S. 28, 43-44 (1971).
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on that promise, have eliminated a previous constitutionally mandated
"actual malice" standard in cases involving "mere" public interest, and have
substantially constricted the public figure category.
The values of free speech and press on the one hand struggle against a
desire to protect the reputations of defamed plaintiffs. The relative impor-
tance of these competing values can be argued until eternity, and probably
will be, but in Hutchinson v. Proxmire Dr. Hutchinson should have had no
valid action against Senator Proxmire. If a person's publicly funded work
cannot be criticized by one who is elected to criticize when he feels it is
appropriate, then our representatives' and our own speech is jeopardized. If
Hutchinson's research could not stand on its own merits against some well-
chosen words, then perhaps Proxmire was right and the research did lack
value. By applying the doctrine of fair comment, the courts could help en-
sure that elected officials play their proper role without hindrance.
The fair comment doctrine should not be confined to publicly funded
work that is criticized by a United States Senator, but must apply to all
discussions of matters of public interest, regardless of the plaintiff's status."
Barring unexpected developments, there will be no uniformity in libel law
for decades into the future because courts on all levels are still reconciling
the common law of libel with New York Times and its aftermath. Two things
are fairly certain: statements formerly safeguarded by an "actual malice" bur-
den because they related to issues of public interest will continue to be
unprotected on the basis of their subject matter; and the public figure cate-
gory, which likewise raises the plaintiff's burden to show "actual malice,"
will continue to shrink. Much of the resulting void can be filled by fair
comment.
Fair comment has been ignored since New York Times focused attention
on truth or falsity. During the halcyon days of "actual malice," the non-
consideration of fair comment did no harm because even with the attention
of the bar fixed upon truth issues, speech about public issues received
adequate protection as defamation defendants won the majority of verdicts.
Now, however, the pendulum is moving to allow more plaintiffs room to
maneuver and recover. As fair comment now exists, it can cover many cases
formerly decided on public interest or public figure bases. In an age of rel-
ativity, more statements will probably be recognized as opinions incapable of
proof as true or false. All of the fair comment elements are elastic, and if
those elements are expanded, fair comment could become the dominant de-
famation defense. Because of the shifting views of libel in the Supreme
Court, opinions may begin to be called opinions, and defended, as they
should be, by fair comment.
282. The idea is not new. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
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APPENDIX
April 18, 1975 Press Release Office of SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE
Wisconsin
FOR RELEASE AFTER 6:30 A.M. Friday, April 18, 1975
Senator William Proxmire (D.-Wis) announced on Friday, "My choice for the Golden Fleece
Award for the biggest waste of taxpayers' money for the month of April goes jointly to the
National Science Foundation, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Office of
Naval Research for spending almost $500,000 in the last seven years to determine under what
conditions rats, monkeys and humans bite and clench their jaws. From the findings of these
studies it is clear that the Government paid a half million dollars to find out that anger, stop-
ping smoking, and loud noises produce jaw clenching in people."
The Wisconsin Senator said, "This is the second in a series of 'fleece of the month' awards
which will climax in a Biggest Waste of the Year Award.
"All this money was given to Dr. Roland [sic] R. Hutchinson of Kalamazoo State Hospital in
Michigan. Last year alone the good doctor spent over $200,000 of which more than $100,000
were federal funds. And what are some of the other results reached by these research projects
in the last seven years?
"Dr. Hutchinson told NASA that people get angry when they feel cheated and tend to clench
their jaws or even scream and kick. NSF learned that Dr. Hutchinson's monkeys became angry
when they were shocked and would try to get away from the shock. In addition, NSF was
informed that drunk monkeys do not usually react as quickly or as often as sober monkeys and
that hungry monkeys get angry more quickly than well-fed monkeys.
"The Office of Naval Research appears to have gotten the same type of so-called research as
did the NSF and NASA.
"It is very interesting to trace the history of these extremely similar and perhaps duplicative
projects. In 1967, NSF gave Dr. Hutchinson $44,700 to study 'Environmental and Physiological
Causes of Aggression.' For two years, Dr. Hutchinson studied the biting reactions of monkeys
when they received electric shocks. He also compared their reaction while being given a num-
ber of different drugs as alcohol and caffeine. In 1969, the NSF gave Dr. Hutchinson another
$26,000 to continue these experiments. He received another grant, this one for $51,200 in 1970
from the NSF.
"By this time Dr. Hutchinson was ready to extend his work to human biting and jaw clench-
ing. In 1970, Dr. Hutchinson received a grant which ran for five years from the ONR to
continue 'research on sub-human primates to determine the environmental, physiological and
biochemical factors responsible for the maintenance of aggressive behavior and systematic rep-
lication of results objected in primates extended to human subjects.' Total funding from the
Navy ran to $207,000.
"During this period, Dr. Hutchinson applied for and received a $50,000 grant from NASA to
develop measurements of latent anger or aggression in humans by means of jaw-clenching. In
addition, Dr. Hutchinson received his fourth NSF grant in 1972 for $51,800 in order to con-
tinue his experiments on monkeys and extend the work to human jaw-clenching.
"Dr. Hutchinson, who in addition to being Research Director of Kalamazoo State Hospital,
is also an Adjunct Professor at Western Michigan University and President of his own non-profit
Foundation for Behavior Research, has proposals presently pending before the NSF, the
National Institute of Drug Abuse, and the National Institute of Mental Health to continue
research on monkeys' drinking, drug and jaw clenching habits. If Dr. Hutchinson is successful
in this new grantsmanship attempt, he would receive an additional $150,000 of taxpayers'
money.
"The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to scream and kick or even
clench my jaw.
"Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as his monkeys grind their
teeth. In fact, the good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a
monkey out of the American taxpayer.
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"It's time for the federal government to get out of this 'monkey business.' In view of the
transparent worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-
drinking monkeys, it's time we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats who fund
him have been taking out of the taxpayer."
Proxmire said that the public is urged to write him in Washington with suggestions for the
"Golden Fleece of the Month" for May.

